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Still an ‘ever-changing Union’? 
Authors' note: This fully revised second edition of the “The Ever-Changing 
Union” provides a concise overview of the EU’s history as well as 
its  institutional structures and decision-making processes as they stand 
following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon  
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 marked the 
end of a long and complicated process of comprehensive treaty revision 
that had commanded considerable political attention from both national 
governments and the European institutions. Tough negotiations, the 
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the electorates in two member 
states and the difficult ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon have taken their 
toll on the enthusiasm of national leaders for further treaty reforms.1 Unlike 
past negotiations, no ‘leftovers’ were identified at the 2007 
Intergovernmental Conference that would have to be dealt with in a future 
round of reforms. As such the Treaty of Lisbon is likely to be the last in a 
long series of treaties since the late 1980s2 that have amended the existing 
treaties in a broad and general way.3 Future treaty changes will probably be 
very limited in scope, like the change envisaged for the establishment of a 
European Stability Mechanism in response to the sovereign debt crisis in 
2010.  
                                                      
1 Austrian and British leaders have even committed to holding referenda for 
substantive future changes. 
2 Namely these are the Single European Act (1987), the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), 
the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and the Treaty of Nice (2003). The year indicates 
when the treaty entered into force.  
3 Legally speaking, the Lisbon Treaty amended the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty establishing the European Community. ii | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
If a treaty change only concerns certain policy-related parts of the EU 
Treaties and if it does not increase the competences already conferred to the 
EU by the Treaties, it can be adopted according to a new “simplified 
revision procedure”, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon.4 Although major 
treaty changes thus seem very unlikely in the foreseeable future, this of 
course does not exclude – and may even enhance – initiatives for 
institutional reforms within or even outside the established treaty 
framework. The EU will thus continue to be an ever-changing Union, 
although in a different way and most likely at a slower pace than in the 
p a s t  2 5  y e a r s ,  w h i c h  h a v e  b e e n  m a r k e d  b y  r e c u r r i n g ,  p r o f o u n d  t r e a t y  
changes.  
The new Treaty in a nutshell: What is new? 
The Treaty of Lisbon continues the tradition of changing the EU’s 
institutional set-up without revolutionising it. It has maintained the 
Union’s distinct sui generis character: the EU will carry on functioning in 
some policy areas (such as the internal market) with powers that are more 
centralised at the EU level (supranational decision-making) and in other 
policy areas (e.g. security and defence) as an international organisation, 
where states have veto powers and decisions are sometimes legally difficult 
to enforce (intergovernmental decision-making). The Treaty has increased 
the number of policy areas where supranational decision-making applies, 
following the ‘Community method’:5 the European Commission makes a 
                                                      
4 The revised Art. 48(6) TEU foresees a unanimous decision by the European 
Council and ratification by all member states according to their respective 
constitutional requirements, but neither a Convention nor an Intergovernmental 
Conference. 
5 With the Treaty of Lisbon the European Community ceased to exist and its legal 
s u c c e s s o r  b e c a m e  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n .  H o w e v e r ,  i t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  c o n t i n u e  
using the well-established expression ‘Community method’ as it is not a legal term. 
The Community method is used to describe the supranational mode of EU 
decision-making, as reflected in the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (formerly 
called ‘co-decision procedure’). In a 2010 speech, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel defined a new “Union method” by distinguishing it from the Community 
method, as “a combination of the community method and coordinated action by 
the member states“ (speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Opening 
Ceremony of the 61st academic year of the College of Europe, Bruges, 2 November 
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legislative proposal that can then be amended by both the member states 
(represented in the Council of Ministers, or ‘Council’) and the European 
Parliament, generally on the basis of some sort of majority rule (qualified 
majority voting). The European Court of Justice normally has a full right of 
scrutiny over the legislative acts adopted. In other areas (mainly but not 
only foreign and security policy) the EU more often applies 
intergovernmental procedures, where member states are the dominant 
actors and decisions are taken unanimously. In all policy areas 
implementation is almost exclusively carried out by member states, 
although monitored to different degrees by the European Commission. In 
practice, as an overall result of the institutional set-up and the great 
number of actors and interests involved, a strong bias towards consensual 
decision-making is likely to persist in all policy areas. 
The Treaty of Lisbon is intended to make the EU more democratic, 
efficient and transparent. In addition to general institutional innovations, 
existing policies have been revamped, some of them significantly. The most 
important changes relate to policies on external matters and those on the 
area of freedom, security and justice.  
•  To enhance democracy, the Treaty of Lisbon has given more powers 
to the democratically elected European Parliament and introduced an 
element of direct democracy with the European Citizens’ Initiative. 
National parliaments, which risk losing power when action is 
deferred to the EU, have been given the right to monitor that the EU 
observes the principle of subsidiarity according to a special 
procedure.6 
•  Measures to improve the EU’s efficiency include more policy areas 
being subject to qualified majority voting (instead of unanimity) and 
a full-time President of the European Council elected for two and a 
                                                                                                                                       
2010 (http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reden/2010/2010-11-02-
merkel-bruegge.html)).  
6 The principle of subsidiarity stipulates that the EU should only act in those areas 
where the same result cannot be achieved just as well at the national or even at the 
regional or local levels. Typical examples where action at the European level 
would have ‘added value’ are on matters with cross-border externalities (e.g. 
environmental policies for cross-border pollution or EU-wide product standards to 
facilitate trade) or scale effects (e.g. joint research or joint external actions). iv | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
half years (instead of the six-monthly rotation of a national leader in 
the chair), just to give two examples. 
•  In terms of transparency, the Treaty states explicitly for the first time 
how competences are divided between the Union and the member 
states. It also strengthens the right of public access to documents, 
while the new provision for a withdrawal procedure highlights the 
fact that Union membership is voluntary with member states being 
free to leave. 
In the area of freedom, security and justice, almost all decisions are 
now to be taken by qualified majority in the Council and not by consensus, 
as was partly the case in the past. The ordinary legislative procedure 
(previously called ‘co-decision’), which gives the European Parliament the 
same power as the Council to amend legislative proposals from the 
European Commission, has been extended to the entire policy area. The 
change primarily concerns police cooperation and judicial cooperation on 
criminal matters (i.e. the former ‘third pillar’).7 
From the beginning, one of the main motivations for the revision of 
the EU Treaties was the ambition to make the Union’s foreign and external 
policies more effective and enhance its role on the international stage. As a 
consequence, the Treaty of Lisbon has merged the two positions of High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the Council and 
the Commissioner in charge of the external relations portfolio, who is now 
also ex-officio one of the vice presidents of the European Commission. This 
new ‘double-hatted’ position is supported by a new European diplomatic 
service, the European External Action Service, which is being set up at the 
time of writing. There are also further important changes in specific fields 
of the EU’s external action, such as trade, development policy, and security 
and defence. These are presented in greater detail in chapter 11. 
                                                      
7 After a transition period of five years, the European Court of Justice will also 
receive full judicial scrutiny over acts adopted on these matters (with the exception 
of the validity and proportionality of police operations and measures taken by the 
member states to maintain law and order or to safeguard internal security). | 1 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The European Union is one of the world’s economic superpowers. Yet it 
is not a state with an army and a police force employed to protect its 
people and property. Originally designed to end a cycle of devastating 
wars on the European continent, the EU has fulfilled this initial raison 
d’être by far. Today it is composed of 27 states (Figure 1) with 4 currently 
in the waiting room to join,8 a population of over half a billion and an 
economy representing almost €12 trillion in GDP (Table 1). The story of 
the EU began over 50 years ago and it is set to remain a dynamic and 
flexible structure in the future – a ‘work in progress’ that has never been 
designed according to a master plan.  
When analysing European integration a key aspect concerns the 
‘nature of the beast’:9 the EU is more than a regular international 
organisation, but less than a nation state. From the EU’s early years 
onwards there has been heated debate on what the new European 
project should eventually look like. Some have called for a 
supranational European federation where member states would give up 
veto rights and transfer power to the European level. Others have 
favoured a more intergovernmental system, where member states 
would keep their veto and cooperate on a voluntary basis. In extreme 
terms, the two options pit a ‘European federation’ against a ‘Europe of 
n a t i o n  s t a t e s ’ .  T h e  s t a t u s  q u o  w i t h  t h e  T r e a t y  o f  L i s b o n  i n  f o r c e  
continues to reflect the middle ground between the two preferences, 
often termed sui generis: the EU being a polity with its own, very special 
characteristics. In some respects, such as the supremacy of its law over 
national laws and its high stakes in policy-making for the internal 
                                                      
8 Those waiting to join are Croatia, Iceland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) and Turkey. Albania, Montenegro and Serbia have 
submitted their applications. Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo are 
potential candidates. 
9 See H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M.A. Pollack, Policy-Making in the European 
Union, 5th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; see also A. Wiener 
and T. Diez, European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.  2
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Table 1. EU-27 – Key figures (selected statistics) 
Population (1 January 2010)  501.1 million 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (in 2010)  €12,284 billion 
Average GDP per capita in PPS* (in 2009)  €23,600 
Poorest member state, GDP per capita in PPS (2009)   Bulgaria: €9,676 
Richest member state, GDP per capita in PPS (2009)  Luxembourg: €63,248 
Number of official languages  23 
*  Purchasing power standard (PPS) measures the price of a comparable and 
representative basket of goods and services in each country. 
Source: Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). 
2.  Phases of EU development 
The fundamental legal basis of the EU is a set of agreements among its 
member states: the EU Treaties. They are usually named after the place 
where they were signed. The negotiations among the EU member states 
on treaty revisions and amendments are known as Intergovernmental 
Conferences (IGCs).  
Broadly speaking we can distinguish four  phases of EU 
development (see Table 2).10 The first stretches from the origins of the 
EU in the early 1950s to the demise of the Bretton Woods system in the 
early 1970s. The next period from the 1970s to the early 1990s initially 
saw a period of stagnation (‘Eurosclerosis’) followed by a reinvigoration 
of the European Community (EC) with the completion of the internal 
market (EC 1992). The third phase can be described as the post-
Maastricht period, which finished with the adoption of the Treaty of 
Nice,11 covering 1992–2000. After Nice, the EU entered a fourth phase, 
which was dominated by a debate on the relationship of an enlarging 
EU with the powers of the individual member states (i.e. on EU 
                                                      
10 Although the creation of the European Union only came about with the 
Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the term is also used for the preceding period in 
this text for reasons of linguistic continuity.  
11 The Treaty of Nice entered into force in 2003. 4 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
competences), as well as with EU citizens (i.e. on support for the EU) 
and with non-EU countries (i.e. on the EU’s external policy role). This 
debate led first to a Constitutional Treaty for the EU, which was agreed 
upon in June 2004. But the Treaty failed to be ratified by all EU member 
states, being voted down in referenda in France and the Netherlands. In 
the first half of 2007 agreement was reached on a text that took up most 
of the elements of the Constitutional Treaty. Unlike the Constitutional 
Treaty, however, the new text would not replace the existing Treaties, but 
returned to the traditional practice of amending them. It was signed by 
the EU’s political leaders on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon, which also 
gave the text its name: the Treaty of Lisbon. Following ratification in all 
member states according to their respective national provisions, the 
Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009. In the following year 
some important aspects still had to be implemented by way of 
legislative acts, such as the European External Action Service mentioned 
above or the European Citizens’ Initiative, through which EU citizens 
will be able to ask (but not force) the European Commission to present 
new policy initiatives in its areas of competence.  
Table 2. Phases of European integration 
Phase  Period  Developments/events  Legal form & treaty 
base (as amended) 
1  1950–70  From its origins to the end of 
the Bretton Woods system 
(1950–70) 
ECSC, Euratom, EEC 
Treaty of Rome 
2  1970–92  From Eurosclerosis to 
revitalisation through ‘EC 1992’ 
EEC 
Single European Act, 
Treaty of Maastricht 
3 1992–2001  Post-Maastricht and beyond: 
Monetary union and steps 
towards political union  
EC & EU  
Treaty of Maastricht, 
Treaty of Amsterdam,  
Treaty of Nice (in 
force 2003) 
4  2001–10   Post-Nice: Failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty;  
Treaty of Lisbon 
EU 
Treaty of Lisbon 
Source: Authors’ compilation. THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 5 
 
Phase 1 – From its origins to the end of the Bretton Woods system 
(1950–70) 
The history of the EU begins with the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), which was founded in the early 1950s and based 
on the Schuman Plan. The underlying philosophy of the Schuman Plan, 
which created rules for a common steel, iron and coal market, was to 
withdraw French and German basic industries from national authority 
in order to make another war impossible. Six European states decided to 
cooperate to achieve this aim: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In political terms, the ECSC can be 
considered a success, not least because it was a first important step in 
the European integration process. Over the last two decades, its 
substantive provisions have been gradually submerged into the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (see the discussion 
below), eventually leading to its expiry in 2002.12 
In addition to the initiatives eventually leading to the EU, many 
other organisations that shaped the post-war era were founded, 
including NATO and the OECD (for an overview see appendix 1). 
An early move towards political union was the attempt to create a 
European Defence Community. Discussed after the successful launch of 
the ECSC, the defence community foresaw the integration of the armies 
of the six ECSC member states (including Germany) into a European 
army. In the end the project failed because the French parliament (more 
specifically the Assemblée Nationale) refused to ratify the Treaty for 
fear of transferring sovereignty over national defence policy. This 
period (1952–53) also saw the abortive attempt to create a European 
Political Union, which sought an integrated European foreign policy. 
Following these failures, efforts to bring forward European 
integration moved away from political and towards economic 
cooperation. The Treaties of Rome,13 signed in 1957, successfully 
reinvigorated the dynamism of the integration process through 
economic integration. The European Economic Community was 
                                                      
12 The ECSC expired in mid-2002 after 50 years of existence. 
13 The “Treaties” here refer to the Treaty on the European Economic 
Community and the Euratom Treaty. 6 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
founded to overcome the sectoral limitations of the ECSC. It aimed at 
developing a common market for all economic sectors through an 
intermediary step, the creation of a customs union. In practical terms 
internal quotas and border tariffs among member states were abolished 
and replaced by a common external tariff. These steps changed the 
business environment in Europe once and for all. The common external 
tariff also marked an important shift in international relations, since it 
implied that it was no longer possible for individual member states to 
conclude bilateral trade agreements in the areas covered by the EEC, an 
important aspect of external relations. A common commercial policy on 
trade was formulated, for which the High Authority (now the European 
Commission) was given the prerogative to represent the Community 
externally (usually on the basis of a mandate approved by the member 
states).  
Atomic energy was another area in which the pooling of national 
sovereignty was envisaged. In 1957 one of the Treaties of Rome 
established the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) to 
bring atomic energy under the European umbrella. The reasons for 
intensified cooperation in this field were the fear of energy import 
dependence in the aftermath of the Suez crisis14 and the wish to reduce 
dependence on US and Soviet military (and with it political) dominance. 
National governments stuck to their desire to control their national 
programmes, however, and the need for nuclear energy only became 
apparent again with the first oil shock in 1973, by which time Euratom 
had already lost some of its original standing.  
An important driver of the European integration process during 
the 1960s and 1970s was the European Court of Justice (ECJ). With 
landmark rulings it confirmed the primacy of EU law over national law 
and established the direct application of EU law (i.e. not necessitating 
transposition by national authorities). Through its rulings the ECJ 
                                                      
14 During the Suez crisis, the UK, France and Israel fought a war against Egypt 
at the end of October 1956, following Egypt’s decision to nationalise the Suez 
canal. Although initially the three allies were largely successful, pressure from 
the US and the Soviet Union forced the allies to withdraw. The outcome of the 
Suez crisis is generally seen as a signal of the weakening of British and French 
global influence.  THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 7 
 
helped to make up for deadlock on the political scene, where some 
European leaders opposed deeper integration. French President Charles 
De Gaulle, for instance, tried to strip the High Authority of its 
supranational aspirations with an attempt to assert the primacy of 
member states. He also attacked majority voting in the Council of 
Ministers by boycotting Council meetings and paralysing EU decision-
making for several months. This so-called ‘empty-chair crisis’ resulted 
in the ‘Luxembourg compromise’, according to which member states 
acknowledged a national veto for policies that are against the ‘vital’ 
interests of one country. As a consequence, actual voting in the Council 
of Ministers remained the exception and consensus the rule. 
Internationally, this phase ended with the demise of the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed currency exchange rates in the 1970s.  
Phase 2 – From Eurosclerosis to revitalisation through EC 1992 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system signalled the beginning of a 
period of slow growth and a general economic crisis. Member states 
resorted to national measures to protect their currencies and their 
industries. The results were non-tariff barriers to trade and an 
increasing economic divergence that threatened achievements such as 
the common market and the common agricultural policy. This period is 
usually referred to as ‘Eurosclerosis’.  
The European Commission reacted by pursuing an active 
competition policy while member states, after they realised that national 
solutions had only made matters worse, became more willing to deepen 
European integration. This gave rise to a new agenda built around three 
principle objectives: the European monetary system (EMS), the internal 
market and further coordination of foreign policy matters by the 
member states. The EMS was designed to stabilise the currencies and 
achieve price stability. The priority of price stability, promoted 
especially by Germany, gradually became accepted by the EU and 
member states. The internal market programme of the European 
Community (‘EC 1992’) was a move on the part of businesses and 
governments to foster the macroeconomic conditions at the European 
level for a healthy economy and, in particular, to enable European 
companies to compete successfully in international markets. Business 
leaders began to lobby the European Commission for a vast expansion 
of common EU rules to govern trade among the member states with 8 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
respect to non-tariff barriers. This culminated in a treaty reform, the 
Single European Act (SEA), entering into force in 1987. The SEA aimed 
at establishing an internal market with the target date of 1992 for its 
completion.15 In practical terms, over the period 1987–92 numerous 
legislative measures were introduced to remove non-tariff trade barriers 
and forge an internal market.  
The development of a common foreign and security policy was 
more difficult and in the end marked by little progress during this 
period. The EU’s external powers remained largely centred around its 
external trade relations, which it used to grant preferred access to the 
EU market for countries whose economic development it wanted to 
support, such as the former colonies. This was coupled with an 
emerging development cooperation policy, which was targeted at the 
former colonies as well, and assisted EU member states in neutralising 
their often-distressed relations with them.  
During the second phase of development important enlargements 
took place. In 1973 the UK, Ireland and Denmark joined, as did Greece 
in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986, with the latter three collectively 
referred to as the ‘southern enlargement’. A major motive for the 
southern enlargement was to provide political stability for countries 
that had experienced a difficult transition from dictatorship to 
democracy. There were also a number of important institutional 
changes. First, as a reaction to the (oil) crisis of the 1970s and a rapidly 
changing international environment after the demise of the Bretton 
Woods system, European heads of state and government began to meet 
on a regular basis. In 1974, these meetings were formally established as 
the European Council, which over time began to provide political and 
strategic leadership to the EU. The regular European Council meetings 
(at that time, two to four per year) also increased the international 
visibility of the EU.16 Second, from 1979 the European Parliament was 
directly elected and the SEA enhanced the role of the European 
Parliament in the decision-making process. Finally, qualified majority 
                                                      
15 A. Cockfield, The European Union: Creating the Single Market, Chichester: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1994, makes interesting reading. 
16 This was also the time around which the G-7 was launched. THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 9 
 
voting was extended to basically all areas related to the internal market. 
This move strengthened the EU’s supranational coverage, as it increased 
the number of areas in which member states would not be able to block 
a decision with their veto.  
Phase 3 – Post-Maastricht and beyond, with monetary union and steps 
towards political union 
The third period reflected both internal and external factors giving a 
boost to the European project. Internally the success of the single market 
programme and the relative success of the EMS had provoked thought 
about a monetary union in which member states could share a common 
currency. Externally the collapse of the Soviet Union catapulted the EU 
into leadership, as German reunification raised concerns about a 
changing European power balance and Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) looked towards EU membership. Transatlantic 
relations also contributed to favourable conditions for European 
integration, with the US demonstrating renewed interest in political 
cooperation at the European level under President George H.W. Bush. 
As a first tangible outcome, the Maastricht Treaty was signed by 
the then 12 member states in 1992. The Treaty introduced new policy 
areas at the European level that greatly expanded the Union’s agenda. It 
turned the European Economic Community into the European 
Community, illustrating the broadening scope for cooperation beyond 
purely economic issues. The Treaty was also a demonstration of the 
ambition to tackle the imbalance between an ‘economic giant’ and a 
‘political dwarf’ that was often used to describe the European 
Community. The Treaty of Maastricht embodied a first attempt at a 
common approach in policy areas that had hitherto been considered the 
traditional competences of sovereign states. It introduced EU citizenship 
(which nevertheless remained dependent on citizenship of an EU 
member state), a structure for cross-border police cooperation (Europol), 
a common approach towards immigration policy and a common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP). In reaction to the wish of some member 
states to keep national control over foreign affairs as well as justice and 
home affairs, a pillar structure of three different pillars was established 
under a common EU roof.  
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The first pillar covered the activities of the old EC Treaties, i.e. the 
policy areas where the EU has strong competences and where the 
‘Community method’17 applied (often with qualified majority voting – 
see chapter 4). In the other pillars, decision-making was organised 
according to the ‘intergovernmental method’ (with unanimity required), 
which applied to the common foreign and security policy (second pillar) 
and justice and home affairs (third pillar, see Figure 2). Parts of justice 
and home affairs were subsequently moved to the first pillar by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), as trust among member states and the 
pressure for cooperation (on visas, asylum and immigration) had 
grown. In the second and third pillars, member states retained their 
right to veto and the European Commission, the European Parliament 
and the European Court of Justice played only a (very) limited role. 
The Maastricht Treaty also consolidated the institutional 
framework of the first pillar. It further enhanced the role of the 
European Parliament by introducing the co-decision procedure for a 
great number of policy areas, thus giving the Council of Ministers and 
the European Parliament equal standing when deciding upon 
legislation (see chapter 4).  
Probably the most important achievement of the Maastricht 
Treaty, however, was the introduction of the euro as a common 
currency, which has been managed by the European Central Bank (ECB) 
since 1999. Membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
entails a major step for the participating states, as it includes giving up 
authority to control the level of interest rates and tying national public 
finances to the Stability and Growth Pact with rules for the national 
budget deficit. Before 1999, in some member states drastic reforms to 
economic policies were required to meet the criteria for participation. 
Three member states decided not to participate: the UK, Denmark and 
Sweden. All ‘new’ EU member states that joined in 2004 and 2007 are 
obliged to eventually become members of the EMU. Slovenia was the 
first to do so in January 2007, followed by Cyprus and Malta in 2008 and 
Slovakia in 2009. Estonia became the 17th member of the eurozone on 1 
January 2011. 
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Figure 2. The EU pillar structure as established by the Treaty of Maastricht 
 
* Subsequently, under the Treaty of Amsterdam, this pillar was formally renamed police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJCC).  
Note: Before the Treaty of Lisbon made the European Union the legal successor of the 
European Community, both names were often used interchangeably. As Figure 2 
illustrates, however, the European Community only covered the first pillar, as the most 
integrated part of the European Union. In essence the first pillar incorporated 
‘traditional EU business’ like the single market, while the other two pillars covered 
‘new’ policy areas. Pillars 2 and 3 remained largely intergovernmental. 
 
Besides the deepening of integration, there was also a further 
widening of the Union: in 1995 Sweden, Austria and Finland joined the 
EU. The European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement was signed with 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. In practice, under the EEA 
Agreement these three countries implement the vast majority of internal 
market legislation although they do not take part in the EU’s decision-
making structures and the definition of the Union’s political objectives 
(see appendix 1). A series of bilateral sector agreements containing 
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was agreed that both Switzerland and Norway pay contributions for 
social and economic cohesion in the enlarged EU.18 
The Treaty of Maastricht was followed by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997. This treaty revision dealt with the unfinished 
business left over from Maastricht, such as streamlining decision-
making, increasing transparency and other institutional aspects. Specific 
achievements were new Treaty provisions on the so-called ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ procedure. This instrument allows a number of member 
states to initiate or move on with a common policy, while others do not 
participate. Under normal circumstances the EU moves at the pace of 
the slowest, leaving considerable leeway for individual states to block 
policies. At the same time there has always been the concern that too 
much flexibility (‘Europe-à-la-carte’) may risk undermining the 
coherence of the Union. The provisions on enhanced cooperation try to 
balance these two aspects and allow for flexible integration within the 
Treaty framework. Until very recently, however, such initiatives have 
only been taken outside the EU Treaties.19 The best-known example is the 
Schengen Agreement of 1985, which abolished border (e.g. passport) 
controls. It was initially signed by just five of the then ten member 
states.20 Subsequently almost all EU member states have become parties 
to the Schengen Agreement, and the Agreement has been integrated 
into the institutional and legal framework of the EU.21 The acceptance 
by all member states of introducing the enhanced cooperation clause 
into the Treaties also stemmed from the understanding that if flexibility 
within the Treaties is not possible, it will most likely be exercised outside 
                                                      
18 For further information, see the External Relations website of the European 
Commission on the countries in the European Free Trade Association 
(http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eea/country.htm). 
19 On 24 March 2010 the European Commission adopted its first proposal for a 
Council Decision authorising enhanced cooperation, more specifically its 
Proposal for a Council Decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the law 
applicable to divorce and legal separation (COM(2010) 104 final/2, Brussels). 
20 At that time they were still operating in the context of the EEC. 
21 Even non-EU members Norway and Iceland have become members of the 
Schengen area, while the UK and Ireland along with Romania, Bulgaria and 
Cyprus remain outside (e.g. passport controls apply). THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 13 
 
the EU framework anyway, but will leave the non-participating member 
states outside with even less influence.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam also established an ‘area of freedom, 
security and justice’ in the EU, which includes external border controls, 
visa, asylum and immigration policy and judicial cooperation. After a 
period of trust-building, member states were ready to move these 
policies (with some restrictions) from the intergovernmental third pillar 
to the supranational first pillar. The same Treaty also brought 
improvements to the efficiency and effectiveness of the common foreign 
and security policy. A key innovation was the establishment of the High 
Representative for the CFSP. From 1999 to 2009 this position was held 
by Javier Solana, whose task was to assist the rotating presidency of the 
E U  i n  t a k i n g  c a r e  o f  t h e  e x t e r n a l  representation of the EU on CFSP 
matters.  
While the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced safeguards against 
governments in “serious and persistent” breach of the Union principles 
(Art. 7 TEU), it failed to address a number of key institutional issues, 
which became known as the ‘Amsterdam leftovers’: 
•  the size and composition of the European Commission, 
•  the weighting of votes in the Council (i.e. the voting shares of the 
individual member states), and 
•  possible extension of qualified majority voting in the Council. 
At its Cologne summit in June 1999 the European Council decided 
to convene a new Intergovernmental Conference and resolve these 
issues before the end of 2000 in order to allow for the Union’s Eastern 
enlargement. 
Phase 4 – Post-Nice and the long process towards a new EU Treaty 
At the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice, the core agenda consisted 
of the three Amsterdam leftovers outlined above (for instance, on the 
voting shares in the Council, see Table 3), notably to make the EU fit for 
enlargement. Agreement, culminating in the Treaty of Nice, was found 
after very difficult negotiations and with a result that was generally 
perceived as the lowest common denominator. 
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Table 3.  Seats in the European Parliament and votes in the Council of 
Ministers according to the Nice Treaty 
Country  Seats in the  
European Parliament* 
Votes in the 
Council** 
Population in 
2010 
(in millions) 
Germany 99  29  81.8 
France 72  29  64.7 
UK 72  29  62.0 
Italy 72  29  60.3 
Spain 50  27  46.0 
Poland 50  27  38.2 
Romania 33  14  21.5 
Netherlands 25  13  16.6 
Greece 22  12  11.3 
Belgium 22  12  10.8 
Portugal 22  12  10.6 
Czech Republic  22  12  10.5 
Hungary 22  12  10.0 
Sweden 18  10  9.3 
Austria 17  10  8.4 
Bulgaria 17  10  7.6 
Denmark 13  7  5.5 
Slovakia 13  7  5.4 
Finland 13  7  5.3 
Ireland 12  7  4.5 
Lithuania 12  7  3.3 
Latvia 8  4  2.2 
Slovenia 7  4  2.0 
Estonia 6  4  1.3 THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 15 
 
Table 3. cont’d 
Cyprus 6  4  0.8 
Luxembourg 6  4  0.5 
Malta 5  3  0.4 
Total 736  345  501.1 
* Figures represent the number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
after the 2009 European elections that still took place on the basis of the Treaty of 
Nice. The total number of seats in the European Parliament was temporarily higher 
(785) than the 736 foreseen by the Treaty due to Romanian and Bulgarian deputies 
having joined mid-term in January 2007. With the Treaty of Lisbon the maximum 
number of MEPs is set at 751. Germany has lost 3 seats, while Spain has gained 4 
seats, Austria, France and Sweden each have gained 2 seats and Bulgaria, Italy, 
Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and the UK have each gained 1 
seat. At the time of writing, ratification of a small treaty change was underway to 
make it possible for the additional MEPs to take office during the 2009–14 
legislature, while all 99 German MEPs will serve the full five-year term until 2014. 
** Qualified majority: for adoption, a proposal must be backed by 
•  255 votes from a total of 345 (about 73.9% of the votes);  
•  plus a majority of member states (or two-thirds in certain cases).  
Furthermore, any member state may request the verification that countries 
supporting the proposal represent at least 62% of the total EU population.  
From 2014 onwards the new Lisbon rules for QMV will apply. These entail 
that a majority is obtained if 
•  55% of the EU member states support the proposal, 
•  which represents at least 65% of the EU population;  
nonetheless, until 2017 a request can be made to use the old rules.  
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
The Treaty of Nice also extended the application of the enhanced 
cooperation mechanism to the area of CFSP, while matters with military 
or defence implications remained excluded.22 The new Treaty abolished 
                                                      
22 The Treaty of Lisbon has nevertheless introduced a new mechanism for 
flexible integration in the field of defence: permanent structured cooperation 
(Arts. 42(6) and 46 TEU as well as Protocol No. 10). To take part in permanent 
structured cooperation on defence, member states must meet certain criteria 
regarding their military capabilities, assessed in cooperation with the European 
Defence Agency (Art. 3 of Protocol No. 10 on Permanent Structured 
Cooperation). The agency – dealing with defence capabilities’ development, 
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the possibility of any one country blocking an initiative and it reduced 
the number of countries necessary to embark on enhanced cooperation 
from a majority to the fixed number of eight.23 Even so, an initiative can 
only go ahead if non-participants are not adversely affected by the 
cooperation and if they have the possibility to join at a later stage. The 
Treaty of Nice only entered into force in February 2003 after a second 
referendum in Ireland, which reversed an initial rejection. 
Many thought that the innovations of the Treaty of Nice were 
insufficient to prepare the EU for enlargement along with other 
challenges, such as a perceived ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU. As a 
consequence, as early as December 2001 European heads of state met at 
a summit in Laeken (Belgium) and decided to convene a Convention on 
the Future of Europe to prepare a more profound revision of the 
Treaties. It ultimately resulted in a text seeking a complete overhaul of 
the institutional framework, in the form of a draft Constitutional Treaty. 
Whereas in the past treaty changes were solely decided by 
government representatives behind closed doors in Intergovernmental 
Conferences, the Convention embodied a new model. Chaired by 
former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, it was not only 
composed of government representatives, but also national and EU 
parliamentarians and the European Commission. Furthermore, besides 
nationals from member states, the Convention included representatives 
from the then candidate countries.24 The assembly managed to agree on 
a draft Constitutional Treaty that formed the starting point and 
blueprint for subsequent negotiations among EU member states in the 
Intergovernmental Conference. In June 2004, under the Irish EU 
presidency agreement was eventually reached. A month earlier, in May 
2004, the EU had also enlarged and accepted ten new member states 
                                                                                                                                 
research, acquisition and armament – has also been formally included in the EU 
Treaties (Art. 42(3) TEU and Art. 46 TEU). 
23 The Treaty of Lisbon has increased this number to nine. 
24 For more information on the Convention, see K. Kiljunen, The European 
Constitution in the Making, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2004; P. 
Norman, The Accidental Constitution, 2nd edition, EuroComment, Brussels, 2005; 
and P. Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe, EuroComment, Brussels, 2004. THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 17 
 
(Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), constituting the EU’s biggest 
enlargement. In January 2007, the EU finalised the enlargement round, 
for which preparations had begun in the late 1990s, with Bulgaria and 
Romania also becoming members. 
As with all reforms to the EU Treaties, the entry into force of the 
Constitutional Treaty necessitated ratification by all EU member states – 
either by their respective national parliaments or through referenda. 
Eighteen countries approved the Treaty, of which two (Spain and 
Luxembourg) did so through referenda. Nevertheless, the 
Constitutional Treaty never entered into force after referenda in France 
and the Netherlands returned negative results in May and June 2005. 
The reasons for the ‘no’ votes were multiple and ranged from unrelated 
issues like dissatisfaction with ruling national governments to 
Euroscepticism and lack of information about the text (particularly in 
the Netherlands) or a general perception of the EU as being too 
economically liberal and not ‘social’ enough (particularly in France).25 
After what was termed a ‘period of reflection’, the treaty reform 
process was put back on track during the German EU presidency in the 
first of half of 2007. At the European Council in May 2007 European 
leaders agreed on a detailed mandate for another Intergovernmental 
Conference. This IGC agreed on a text that preserved most of the 
content of the Constitutional Treaty, but stripped the text of its 
constitutional symbolism. Instead of replacing the existing Treaties, the 
new Treaty would again amend them – as the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
the Treaty of Nice had done so before. With more protocols, 
declarations and safeguard clauses, the new Treaty of Lisbon added 
another layer to the existing ones, thereby not making any simpler the 
 
                                                      
25 See European Commission, The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey 
in the Netherlands, Flash Eurobarometer 172, Brussels, June 2005 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl172_en.pdf); see also European 
Commission, La Constitution européenne: sondage post-référendum en France, Flash 
Eurobarometer 171, Brussels, June 2005 (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ 
flash/fl171_fr.pdf).  18 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
structure of the existing Treaties (renamed the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU)). 
Starting immediately after heads of state and government signed 
the Treaty in Lisbon on 13 December 2007, the ratification process took 
almost two years and faced a number of challenges. In Ireland, the first 
referendum on 12 June 2008 resulted in rejection. At the European 
summit in December 2008 the Irish government indicated its willingness 
to hold a second referendum on the Treaty in 2009. In return national 
leaders agreed that Ireland would be provided legal assurances that the 
Treaty of Lisbon would not grant the EU any additional powers on a 
number of issues identified as sensitive by the Irish government 
(taxation, the right to life, education and family, and security and 
defence) and also that there would continue to be one Commissioner 
per member state beyond 2014. After these guarantees were given, a 
second successful referendum was held on 2 October 2009.26In the 
summer of the same year, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
gave a ruling on the legality of the new treaty with the German 
Constitution27 allowing the President to conclude the German 
ratification. After the second Irish referendum, the Polish and the Czech 
                                                      
26 The legal guarantees have taken the initial form of a decision by the heads of 
state and government, which is legally binding and which entered into force at 
the same time as the Treaty of Lisbon. In the future, the legal guarantees will 
then take the form of a protocol that will be attached to the EU Treaties. In the 
same context, the heads of state and government also agreed on a “Solemn 
Declaration on Workers’ Rights and Social Policy”, confirming the high degree 
of importance the Union attaches to these issues. The European Council of 
December 2008 also agreed that a decision would be taken to the effect that the 
European Commission shall continue to include one national of each member 
state beyond 2014. 
27 The Court found the Treaty of Lisbon to be compatible with the German 
Constitution, but demanded changes to the German ratification law. It was 
revised to strengthen the position of the German parliament (Bundestag and 
Bundesrat) concerning government action at the EU level. The text of the 
judgment of 30 June 2009 is available in English on the website of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entsch 
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Presidents28 also signed their respective ratification instruments, and the 
Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU attained a single legal 
personality and became the legal successor of the European 
Community. As a consequence the pillar structure established by the 
Treaty of Maastricht was abolished. Yet one policy area, CFSP, largely 
continues to follow intergovernmental rules, with the Lisbon Treaty 
even explicitly stating that CFSP “is subject to specific rules and 
procedures”.29 In this area, the adoption of EU legislative acts remains 
excluded. In contrast, with very few exceptions, matters that came 
under the former third pillar on justice and home affairs were brought 
under the co-decision procedure, now referred to as the ‘ordinary 
legislative procedure’.30 
To understand the EU, it is important to bear in mind that it 
remains a work in progress. While national leaders have little interest in 
major treaty changes that would create new competences or authority 
for the EU, and as a consequence require referenda in a number of 
member states, the Treaty of Lisbon allows for limited treaty changes in 
the “simplified revision procedure”.31 Such changes may not increase 
EU competences and are limited to Part III of the TFEU, which covers 
essentially all EU internal policies, such as those on the internal market, 
                                                      
28 To meet the concerns of the Czech President Vaclav Klaus, the European 
Council agreed on a draft protocol providing for the extension of Protocol No. 
30 to the Czech Republic, thus providing the same clarifications on the 
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in the Czech 
Republic as for the UK and Poland. Similar to the Irish legal guarantees, this 
agreement in the form of a protocol is to be ratified in the future. 
29 See Art. 24(1) TEU. 
30 ‘Opt-outs’ in the area of freedom, security and justice – which were 
introduced by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties for the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark – have been maintained and extended to police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. 
31 The revised Art. 48(6) TEU foresees a unanimous decision by the European 
Council and ratification by all member states according to their respective 
constitutional requirements, but no Convention and no Intergovernmental 
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Economic and Monetary Union, the area of freedom, security and 
justice, the environment, agriculture and competition. Other important 
changes could certainly be introduced within the Treaty framework, e.g. 
through an increasing use of enhanced cooperation, inter-institutional 
agreements among the EU institutions, political decisions or changes to 
the internal rules of procedure that apply to the institutions. Further 
developments could also come from agreements outside the EU Treaties 
that may subsequently be ‘imported’ at a later stage. In addition, the 
impact of actual institutional practices and the interpretation of the 
Treaty provisions by the European Court of Justice should not be 
underestimated. 
3.  The EU institutions and the political system 
The EU has the following institutions:32 
•  the European Parliament 
•  the European Council 
•  the Council of Ministers 
•  the European Commission 
•  the Court of Justice of the European Union 
•  the European Central Bank, and 
•  the Court of Auditors. 
The three main institutions of the EU – referred to as the 
‘institutional triangle’ – have traditionally been the European 
Commission (representing the Union’s interests), the Council of 
Ministers (representing the different member states) and the European 
Parliament (representing EU citizens).33 
                                                      
32 See also Art. 13 TEU. 
33 For more details on all EU institutions and their functioning, see E. Bomberg, 
J. Peterson and A. Stubb, The European Union: How Does it Work?, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008; see also D. Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An 
Introduction to European Integration, 4th edition, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010; and N. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 7th 
edition, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 21 
 
With the Treaty of Lisbon the European Council (consisting of the 
heads of state and government of the member states together with its 
permanent President and the President of the European Commission) 
has also been granted institutional status. As such it has its own rules of 
procedure and a (small) budget line.  
While the European Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Auditors already had the status of EU institutions, the European Central 
Bank is newly featured on the list, but it retains its own legal personality 
and independence vis-à-vis the other institutions and member states.  
3.1  The European Council 
The European Council34 is the institution through which the heads of 
state and government plus its permanent President and the European 
Commission President meet at least four times a year (the European 
summits). In contrast to the Council of Ministers, strictly speaking the 
European Council has no legislative powers, as its main task is to 
provide political guidance from the highest political level.35 Rather than 
a legislator, the European Council’s function is that of a political 
instigator. As such it is meant to provide the Union with the necessary 
impetus for its development and to define the general political 
guidelines of the EU. Political issues of a long-term perspective – such as 
the multi-annual budget or enlargement – are usually decided at the 
European Council level. In practice, it also acts as a political mediator 
among the configurations of the Council of Ministers, particularly when 
issues of a cross-sectoral or horizontal character are decided or as a 
decision-making body of last resort, in cases where the Council of 
Ministers fails to agree. 
With the Treaty of Lisbon the European Council has not only 
received the status of an institution, but also a permanent President, 
                                                      
34 The Council of Ministers and the European Council are not to be confused with 
the Council of Europe, which is a completely different international organisation 
that is not part of the EU’s institutional framework (see appendix 1). 
35 See Art. 15(1) TEU: “The European Council shall provide the Union with the 
necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political 
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elected for a term of two and a half years (renewable once). The Treaty 
of Lisbon has thus ended the six-monthly rotation of a head of state or 
government at the helm of the European Council and replaced it with a 
position that performs this function on a ‘full-time’ basis. The position is 
currently held by former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy. 
Since he has no staff of his own except his cabinet and spokespersons, 
the President relies on the Council Secretariat, under the authority of its 
Secretary-General, to assist him in carrying out his duties. The President 
chairs European summits and has to facilitate consensus within the 
European Council. He must ensure the preparation and continuity of 
the work of the European Council in cooperation with the European 
Commission President and he represents the EU externally at the level 
of heads of state and government for matters covered by the CFSP, 
although “without prejudice to the powers of the High 
Representative”.36 In view of the rather soft Treaty provisions, it is clear 
that the actual influence of this position derives from its agenda-setting 
power and the political skills of the person in office.  
3.2  The Council of Ministers 
In the Council of Ministers, national representatives meet in ten 
different configurations, depending on the policy issue, e.g. 
environmental ministers for environmental legislation, economic 
ministers for the internal market, and agricultural ministers for the 
common agricultural policy.37 All the Council formations are presided 
by the member state holding the six-month rotating presidency, with 
the exception of the Foreign Affairs Council, which has been presided 
over by the High Representative since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into 
force (Box 1).38 
   
                                                      
36 See Art. 15(6) TEU.  
37 For an overview, see “Council configurations”, on the website of the Council 
of the European Union (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp? 
id=427&lang=en&mode=g).  
38 When trade issues are discussed, the Foreign Affairs Council continues to be 
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Box 1. A new EU foreign policy chief supported by a new foreign service 
The Treaty of Lisbon has merged the two positions of High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the one hand and Vice President 
of the European Commission in charge of the external relations portfolio on 
the other. The first appointee for this new ‘double-hatted’ position is 
Baroness Catherine Ashton (since 1 December 2009). The High 
Representative is appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified 
majority and with the agreement of the President of the European 
Commission, while the Vice President is appointed as a member of the 
College of Commissioners, which includes a hearing before the European 
Parliament.  
The position of Vice President of the European Commission entails 
the responsibilities incumbent on the European Commission in external 
relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action 
to ensure consistency. 
The position of High Representative comes with the responsibility for 
conducting the CFSP, chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, submitting the 
necessary proposals and receiving executive mandates from the Council. 
The same applies to the common security and defence policy. 
The High Representative represents the Union on matters relating to 
the CFSP, in conjunction with the President of the European Council (with 
the latter doing so at the level of heads of state and government). One can 
thus normally expect the High Representative to represent the EU on 
matters dealt with by foreign ministers. When for instance the US President 
and Secretary of State visit the EU, it can be expected that the US President 
would be welcomed by the Presidents of the European Commission and the 
European Council. The US Secretary of State would be welcomed by the 
High Representative. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
EU was represented at the highest level by the President of the European 
Commission as well as the president/prime minister of the member state 
holding the rotating presidency of the Council. At the level of foreign 
ministers the EU was represented by the foreign minister of the member 
state holding the rotating EU presidency.  
 
 
 
 
 24 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
Box 1. cont’d 
The external representation of the Union on issues other than CFSP 
has not fundamentally changed: concerning EU policies the European 
Commission normally represents the EU (i.e. the President at the level of 
heads of state and government and the relevant Commissioner at the 
ministerial level). For those aspects of external policy that remain a national 
competence but which are touched by international negotiations involving 
the EU as a whole (and which do not belong to the CFSP), there is no 
general agreement on who should represent the EU externally. In those 
situations the representation is decided on case-by-case basis and usually 
involves a joint representation of stakeholders (the Commission and 
Member states, potentially the High Representative) under leadership of 
either the European Commission, the rotating presidency of the Council, 
the High Representative. In some specific situations, however, other forms 
of representation can be envisaged.   
In fulfilling the mandate, the High Representative is to be assisted by 
the European External Action Service (EEAS), comprising officials from the 
European Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council as well as 
the diplomatic services of the member  states. The organisation and 
functioning of this service have been established by the Council, acting on a 
proposal from the High Representative, after consulting Parliament and 
obtaining the consent of the European Commission (Art. 27(3) TEU). The 
Council adopted a decision on 26 July 2010 after difficult negotiations 
involving the High Representative, the Council, the European Commission 
and the European Parliament (so-called ‘quadrilogues’). To become 
operational, the EEAS has also required changes to the financial and the 
staff regulations, as well as an amended budget. The EEAS was officially 
launched on 1 December 2010, a year after the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon. 
 
The Council of Ministers remains the primary law-making body of 
the EU, although the number of areas where it has to share this 
competence with the European Parliament (in the framework of the 
ordinary legislative procedure, formerly referred to as ‘co-decision’) has 
grown continually with each treaty reform. The Treaty of Lisbon has 
given the legislative competences of the European Parliament another 
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legislative procedure from an estimated 80% under the Treaty of Nice to 
about 95% under the Treaty of Lisbon. As noted earlier, the entire 
domain of CFSP remains excluded, however.  
One of the Council configurations is the General Affairs Council 
(GAC). It is composed of the 27 foreign ministers or state secretaries for 
EU affairs of the member states and meets at least monthly. As the name 
suggests, it deals with general and horizontal matters of the EU. As such 
it discusses EU institutional issues, enlargement and the multi-annual 
budget. Another important Council configuration is the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin), where for instance the EU’s annual 
budget is discussed.39 Altogether there are nearly 100 meetings of all the 
Council configurations per year. 
Unlike the European Council, the Council of Ministers continues 
to be chaired by a presidency that rotates among member states on a six-
monthly basis. The only exception is the Foreign Affairs Council and its 
preparatory bodies, which are chaired by the High Representative for 
the CFSP or her staff. A strengthening of the rotating system has been 
envisaged through ‘team presidencies’, according to which three 
subsequent presidencies work closely together in their programming to 
ensure consistency in the Council’s work.  
The member state holding the rotating presidency has two 
nationals at the negotiation table: one to chair the meeting and represent 
the Council and one to defend the national interest of the member state. 
Generally, the presidency avoids pushing its national objectives and 
rather attempts to achieve a consensus among all countries. As its term 
is short, the presidency often relies heavily on the Council Secretariat in 
Brussels. The Council Secretariat briefs the presidency, helps to prepare 
the agendas and reports on progress. The Council Secretariat is 
managed by the Secretary-General. With the Treaty of Lisbon, most of 
its foreign policy tasks have been transferred from Directorate E – 
                                                      
39 When the Ecofin Council examines dossiers related to the euro and EMU, the 
representatives of the member states whose currency is not the euro do not take 
part in the vote of the Council. Ecofin meetings are preceded by those of the 
‘Eurogroup’, which is composed of the ministers from member states whose 
currency is the euro and which deals with issues relating to EMU. The 
Eurogroup is an informal body that is not a configuration of the Council.  26 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
External and Political-Military Affairs of the General Secretariat to the 
European External Action Service. 
Meetings of the Council of Ministers are supported by a wealth of 
preparatory bodies that together function as a filter. At a first stage, 
national civil servants and diplomats meet to deal with mostly technical 
and uncontroversial issues. They meet within the senior committees and 
working parties, of which around 160 have been established with the 
aim of reaching agreement on as many aspects as possible.40 Important 
senior committees include the Political and Security Committee (PSC), 
the Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI) introduced by the 
Treaty of Lisbon to promote and strengthen cooperation on internal 
security within the EU, the Trade Policy Committee41 and the Special 
Committee on Agriculture. Among the working parties, the 
Environment Working Party stands out, as it meets about three days a 
week and deals with a large number of environmental files. With the 
exception of CFSP issues, chaired mostly by staff of the High 
Representative, almost all meetings in the Council are chaired by the 
rotating presidency (Table 4) and take place according to a fixed seating 
order (Figure 3). 
Only those aspects that cannot be agreed among member state 
experts (so-called ‘B items’) are then referred to the next level: 
COREPER, the Committee of Permanent Representatives to the EU, 
which actually consists of two separate committees. COREPER II is 
composed of the permanent representatives of the EU member states, 
 
                                                      
40 See L. Van Schaik et al., Policy Coherence for Development in the Council: 
Strategies for the way forward, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2006; 
see also S. Hagemann and J. De Clerck-Sachsse, Old Rules, New Game: Decision-
making in the Council of Ministers after the 2004 Enlargement, CEPS Special Report, 
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, March 2007. 
41 Before the Treaty of Lisbon this committee was known as the ‘Article 133 
Committee’, named after the treaty article by which it was created (this article 
has since become Art. 207, but the committee is no longer named after the 
article).  THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 27 
 
normally ambassadors who head the permanent representations42 of the 
member state to the EU and deal with external policies, negotiations on 
the EU budget and other sensitive issues. It is a close-knit group that 
meets once a week officially and even more frequently informally to 
discuss, for instance, foreign policy issues. COREPER I brings together 
the deputy permanent representatives and deals mostly with what was 
previously called first pillar policies, e.g. the single market and all its 
technical and regulatory aspects. 
Table 4. Council presidency – Order of rotation 
Year  Period Country  Year  Period Member  state 
2010 July-Dec  Belgium  2015 July-Dec Luxembourg 
2011 Jan-June  Hungary  2016 Jan-June Netherlands 
2011  July-Dec Poland  2016 July-Dec Slovakia 
2012  Jan-June Denmark  2017 Jan-June Malta 
2012  July-Dec Cyprus  2017 July-Dec UK 
2013  Jan-June Ireland  2018 Jan-June Estonia 
2013  July-Dec Lithuania  2018 July-Dec Bulgaria 
2014  Jan-June Greece  2019 Jan-June Austria 
2014  July-Dec Italy  2019 July-Dec Romania 
2015  Jan-June Latvia  2020 Jan-June Finland 
Source: Council Decision of 1 January 2007 determining the order in which the office 
of President of the Council shall be held, published in the Official Journal on 
4.1.2007. 
   
                                                      
42 Permanent representations are similar to embassies, but they are diplomatic 
entities in relation to the EU as a whole and not to any specific country. In 
addition, non-EU member states usually have specific diplomats working on 
EU issues in ‘missions’ (e.g. the US mission to the EU).  2
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voting system will replace the current rules only from 2014 onwards. 
Moreover, there will be a period until 2017 when each member state can 
demand that the current rules be applied instead of the double-majority 
system. The voting system was one of the most contested elements in 
the negotiations on the Treaty of Lisbon, as certain countries (e.g. 
Germany) are set to gain voting power under the new system, while 
others (e.g. Poland and Spain) are set to lose. The Polish government in 
particular was opposed to the new system until additional clauses were 
agreed that would guarantee further negotiations if a certain number of 
countries – even if not constituting a blocking minority – are against a 
proposal (inspired by the ‘Ioannina compromise’).43 
The change to a new voting system is seen as especially important 
as the Treaty of Lisbon has increased the number of cases where 
national vetoes have been abolished. Qualified majority voting has been 
introduced to 44 new cases:  
•  24 cases relate to issues formerly requiring unanimity, notably 
concerning implementation of provisions on the area of freedom, 
security and justice (border controls, asylum, immigration, 
Eurojust and Europol);44 proposals under the CFSP made by the 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at the 
request of the European Council; the arrangements for monitoring 
the exercise of the European Commission’s executive powers (also 
                                                      
43 The Ioannina compromise refers to a decision taken at an informal meeting of 
foreign ministers in the Greek city of Ioannina on 29 March 1994, laying down 
that if members of the Council representing between 23 votes (the old blocking 
minority threshold) and 26 votes (the new threshold) express their intention to 
oppose the taking of a decision by the Council by qualified majority, the 
Council will do all within its power, within a reasonable space of time, to reach 
a satisfactory solution that can be adopted by at least 68 votes out of 87 (source: 
“Europa Glossary”). 
44 Eurojust is a judicial cooperation body. Europol is a European law 
enforcement agency for improving cooperation of the EU law enforcement 
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known as ‘comitology’);45 and establishing special tribunals and 
amending parts of the statutes of the Court of Justice and of the 
European System of Central Banks; and 
•  20 cases concern new legal bases, for example on the principles 
and conditions for operating services of general economic 
interest,46 and the arrangements for protecting intellectual 
property, energy, humanitarian aid and civil protection.  
3.3  The European Commission 
3.3.1  Composition 
The European Commission that took office in February 2010 consists of 
one Commissioner per member state and has 27 members, including 
those from Romania and Bulgaria, which joined the EU in January 2007. 
The European Commission’s President José Manuel Barroso was 
appointed by the European Council and confirmed by the European 
Parliament for a second term. The rules for the appointment under the 
Treaty of Lisbon make a link between the (party-) political background 
of the person, who the European Council proposes on the basis of 
qualified majority and in view of the outcome of the European 
parliamentary elections. The presidential nominee must then be elected 
by the European Parliament. The position of the European Commission 
President has been further strengthened, giving him more powers over 
his colleagues than in the past.47 
  
                                                      
45 Comitology describes the EU system of delegating detailed implementing 
measures to the executive through committees that consist of member states 
and are chaired by the European Commission.  
46 In Eurojargon, services of general economic interest refer to those that are to 
be provided even where the market is not sufficiently profitable for the supply 
of such services. 
47 For example, the European Commission President can request a member of 
the European Commission to resign, even without the approval of the other 
Commissioners (Art. 17(6), second subparagraph TEU). THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 31 
 
Commissioners are appointed by prime ministers in agreement 
with the designated Commission President, but need to be confirmed as 
a team (the ‘College’) by a vote of consent from the European 
Parliament. Commissioners are appointed for a term of five years, in 
line with the Parliament’s tenure. Each Commissioner, including the 
President, has one vote when the European Commission votes. The 
voting rule applied on such occasions is a simple majority (>50%) and 
the vote of the European Commission President decides if there is a tie. 
In reality, however, the College reportedly has not proceeded to a vote 
since 2004. 
The European Commission is collectively responsible for its 
decisions and Commissioners are pledged to serve the EU interest. They 
are not supposed to take any instructions from a national government or 
other external actor. Commissioners nonetheless have an important role 
in keeping the link between the European Commission and their 
national publics, and therefore provide a crucial clearing-house for 
differences between the respective member states and the Commission. 
Concerning the size of the College, the Treaty of Lisbon actually 
foresaw reducing the number of Commissioners to two-thirds of the 
number of member states from 2014 onwards (based on a system of 
equal rotation among all nationalities). But the measure to reduce the 
College was dropped, in accordance with the conditions set by the Irish 
government in order for the latter to organise a new referendum on the 
Lisbon Treaty. The new Treaty contains a provision according to which 
the European Council can decide unanimously to keep the rule of one 
Commissioner per member state.  
The cabinets of Commissioners play an important role within the 
European Commission. Each cabinet has about eight members who 
keep the Commissioner updated on specific issues and brief the 
Commissioner when a discussion is scheduled for a particular European 
Commission meeting. Separately and before the Commissioners meet, 
the chefs de cabinet (comparable with heads of private offices) meet under 
the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the European Commission 
to prepare the regular Commission meetings, which generally take place 32 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
on Wednesdays.48 Each Commissioner selects his or her own cabinet. In 
the past, cabinets were dominated by members with the same 
nationality as the Commissioner, which gave rise to complaints about 
the influence of national interests in the European Commission. As a 
consequence, during the Prodi Commission (1999–2004) the practice of 
selecting half of the cabinet staff from nationalities other than the 
Commissioner’s was encouraged. This practice has been further 
extended, under both the Barroso I (2004–10) and Barroso II 
Commissions (2010– to the present).  
The services of the European Commission are divided into 
Directorates-General (DGs), which are subdivided into Policy, External 
Relations, General Services and Internal Services DGs (see Box 2). With 
the establishment of the European External Action Service, however, 
almost the entire DG RELEX (External Relations) and parts of DG DEV 
(Development) have been transferred to this new service. The Legal 
Service deserves particular mention; it gives its legal opinion on 
planned decisions and legislative initiatives. It is rare that the opinion of 
the Legal Service is disregarded. Another important service is that of the 
European Commission’s Secretariat-General, which is responsible for 
horizontal coordination and communication within the Commission. 
The Secretary-General is one of the most senior officials of the European 
Commission and chairs key committee meetings. 
The number of DGs and Commissioners is not the same, as several 
DGs work for more than one Commissioner. In some cases one 
Commissioner is responsible for more than one DG, while in others 
there are several Commissioners working with one DG. 
Before proposals go to the cabinets and Commissioners for 
approval they undergo an ‘inter-service’ consultation, in which all 
related DGs are consulted on draft versions of legislative proposals. At 
the same time, an integrated impact assessment process is conducted, 
which includes a cost-benefit analysis and a justification for the choice 
of policy instrument in comparison with alternative policy options.  
                                                      
48 During plenary sessions of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, these take 
place on Tuesdays. THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 33 
 
Box 2. Directorates-General of the European Commission 
Policy DGs 
Agriculture and Rural Development 
(AGRI) 
Climate Action (CLIMA) 
Competition (COMP) 
Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) 
Education and Culture (EAC) 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities (EMPL) 
Energy (ENER) 
Enterprise and Industry (ENTR) 
Environment (ENV) 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE) 
Health and Consumers (SANCO) 
Home Affairs (HOME) 
Information Society and Media (INFSO) 
Internal Market and Services (MARKT) 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
Justice (JUST)  
Regional Policy (REGIO) 
Research (RTD) 
Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD) 
Mobility and Transport (MOVE) 
 
External relations DGs 
Enlargement (ELARG) 
EuropeAid Development and 
Cooperation (DEVCO) 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
(ECHO) 
Trade (TRADE) 
 
 
DG RELEX (External Relations) ceased 
to exist, with most of its staff having 
been transferred to the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) on 1 
January 2011.  
The Foreign Policy Instruments Service 
(FPIS) manages EU external cooperation 
programmes for which the European 
Commission continues to be 
responsible; the staff are co-located with 
the EEAS and report to the High 
Representative in her capacity as a Vice 
President of the European Commission. 
 
General services DGs 
Communication (COMM) 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
Eurostat 
Publications Office (OP) 
Secretariat-General (SG) 
 
Internal services 
Budget (BUDG) 
Bureau of European Policy Advisers 
(BEPA) 
Informatics (DIGIT) 
Infrastructure and Logistics (OIB/OIL) 
Internal Audit Service (IAS) 
Interpretation (SCIC) 
Legal Service (SJ) 
Human Resources and Security (HR) 
Translation (DGT) 
Source: European Commission, “Departments (Directorate-Generals) and services”, 
7 December 2010 (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs_en.htm). 34 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
In the past, appointments of European Commission staff followed 
a rough quota system with nationality being an important aspect. 
Entering the European Commission and other institutions typically 
required passing the ‘concours’ or competition, which essentially tested 
knowledge. Recruitment has since been bundled into the European 
Personnel Selection Office (EPSO), a kind of assessment centre with a 
stronger focus on competence and skills to ensure that applicants better 
match the job requirements. The process remains highly competitive 
and can easily take more than a year. The European Commission 
employs around 20,000 officials directly, not including translators. 
Besides permanent staff, it also employs temporary and contract agents 
for much of its work.  
3.3.2  Functions 
The European Commission has five basic functions:  
•  the right and duty of initiating Union action and legislation; 
•  the role of guardian of the Treaties; 
•  responsibility for the implementation of Union decisions;  
•  decision-making authority in the field of competition policy; and 
•  external representation of the EU, with the exception of the CFSP 
and other cases explicitly provided for in the Treaties.49 
i)  The right of initiative 
With few exceptions, the European Commission has a monopoly – at 
least in the strict legal sense – on initiating legislation (i.e. the right of 
initiative), although it often takes action after it has been asked to do so 
by the European Council. The Treaty also gives the Council and the 
European Parliament the possibility to request the European 
Commission to take action. Furthermore, with the new instrument of 
the European Citizens’ Initiative, a million EU citizens can ‘invite’ the 
European Commission to make a legislative proposal. Yet in all cases 
                                                      
49 See S. Kurpas, C. Grøn and P.M. Kaczyński, The European Commission after 
enlargement: Does more add up to less?, CEPS Special Report, Centre for European 
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the ultimate decision (and responsibility) on whether to take action 
remains with the European Commission. Not least the smaller member 
states feel that this exclusive right of initiative safeguards their interests 
best, as the European Commission is meant to be the advocate of the 
‘common EU interest’.  
The right of initiative makes the European Commission the engine 
for integration and provides the main source of its power. With very 
few exceptions the Council and the European Parliament can only 
decide on the basis of a European Commission proposal.50 This gives the 
European Commission a key role in the identification of common 
interests and makes it an important interlocutor for stakeholders and 
interest groups (see chapter 10). To plan its initiatives the European 
Commission used to develop a strategic programme for the year ahead, 
the Annual Policy Strategy (APS), which it presented in February of the 
preceding year and which translated into the operational work 
programme of the European Commission. In 2010 the European 
Commission ceased presenting an APS, and instead the Commission 
President gave a state of the union speech before the European 
Parliament. The occasion coincided with a letter he had sent to MEPs in 
which he outlined the European Commission’s main policy initiatives to 
be taken up in the Commission’s work programme for 2011. This 
innovation has taken place against the background of the changes 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and the new framework agreement 
between the European Commission and the European Parliament.51 
                                                      
50 In the area of the former third pillar (i.e. police and judicial cooperation on 
criminal matters) an initiative can also be put forward by a quarter of the 
member states (Art. 76 TFEU). In the area of CFSP the adoption of legislative 
acts is excluded (Art. 24(1) TEU), but non-legislative initiatives or proposals can 
be submitted to the Council by any member state, by the High Representative 
or by the High Representative with the European Commission’s support (Art. 
30(1) TEU). 
51 With the revisions made by the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU Treaty now 
explicitly mentions that the European Commission shall initiate the Union’s 
annual and multi-annual programmes with a view to achieving inter-
institutional agreements (Art. 17(1) TEU).  36 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
Another novelty is the political guidelines that Commission 
President Barroso presented in September 2009 in the context of 
obtaining the European Parliament’s approval for a second term in 
office. In this document Barroso outlined his policy priorities in order to 
find the necessary support in the Parliament.52 
In its role as the engine for integration, the European Commission 
consults extensively with member states (in particular with the 
presidency of the Council of Ministers, which decides upon its agenda), 
the European Parliament and stakeholders. In addition, the European 
Commission is responsible for the budget and its execution. In that 
sense the European Commission is a political manager with a unique 
European outlook that balances the different national and political 
interests coming from the other institutions, member states and interest 
groups.  
ii)  The guardian of the Treaties 
As guardian of the Treaties, the European Commission is responsible 
for the proper implementation and the enforcement of Union law. It 
polices the administration of EU law and assigns judgements against 
governments (including fines) or individuals who violate the Treaties. 
As a last resort, it can take offenders to the European Court of Justice 
(see Box 3). In the past this has been mainly the case for violations of 
legislation related to the internal market. The European Commission 
takes a tough stance if member states fail to transpose, implement or 
enforce Union legislation. Enforcement follows a standardised 
procedure. 
  
                                                      
52 See J.M. Barroso, Political Guidelines for the Next Commission, European 
Commission, Brussels, 2009 (http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
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Box 3. Infringement procedure 
The infringement procedure is regulated by Art. 258 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU):  
  If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an 
obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the 
matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its 
observations. If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within 
the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter 
before the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
Detailed rules of procedure have been drawn up as the European 
Commission’s internal rules have been established by legal practice or case 
law. Important features are the opening of the procedure by a letter of 
formal notice, and the possibility for the concerned member state to submit 
its observations on the identified problem within a given time limit. The 
purpose of this ‘pre-litigation phase’ is also to enable the respective 
member state to conform voluntarily to the requirements of Union law. The 
European Commission will then issue a reasoned opinion. It is based on the 
letter of formal notice and gives a detailed statement of the reasons that 
have led the European Commission to assume that the member state 
concerned has not fulfilled its obligations under the Treaties or secondary 
EU legislation. Referral by the European Commission to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) opens the actual litigation procedure. The ECJ will 
decide whether there has been an infringement and what penalty may 
apply.* 
With the Treaty of Lisbon, the infringement procedure has been 
reinforced by introducing two new features: 
•  For infringement proceedings based on the failure of a member state 
to notify the national transposition measure of a directive, the 
European Commission has been given the possibility to propose 
penalty payments or a lump sum already at the stage of the first 
referral to the Court (Art. 260(3) TFEU). 
•  A reasoned opinion from the European Commission for cases of non-
compliance with ECJ judgments is no longer necessary before the 
Commission can take the member state again to the Court (Art. 260(2) 
TFEU). 
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Box 3. cont’d 
Of the 143 ECJ judgments in 2009 concerning the failure of a member 
state to fulfil its obligations, the Court declared infringements in 134 cases, 
with the action being dismissed in only 9 cases. The average length of an 
infringement procedure closed in 2009 by the ECJ was 17.1 months.** 
Penalties are calculated as daily fines based on a complex formula, 
including the seriousness and length of the breach and the ability to pay, 
expressed as per capita income. 
 
* See the European Commission’s website, “Application of EU law”, “Infringements 
of EU Law”, 1 March 2011 (http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/infringements/ 
infringements_en.htm). 
** See the website of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual Report 
2009(http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-05/ 
ra09_stat_cour_final_en.pdf). 
iii)  Implementation of Union policy  
In this area of the European Commission’s executive powers – 
traditionally referred to as comitology – the Treaty of Lisbon has 
brought important innovations. It has introduced a distinction between 
delegated acts on the one hand (“non-legislative acts of general 
application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of 
the legislative act”, Art. 290 TFEU) and mere implementing acts on the 
other (Art. 291 TFEU). A typical delegated act would be amending an 
annex listing the items (e.g. goods or species) to which the respective 
legislative act applies, while a typical implementing act would deal with 
the purely technical aspects of implementing the legislative act. In the 
past, the division between acts falling under the different comitology 
procedures has occasionally been somewhat blurred and the new 
system holds potential for greater clarity.  
•  Delegated acts are subject to the ex-post control of both branches 
of the legislator, i.e. the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers, on an equal footing. Delegated acts prepared and 
adopted by the European Commission can only enter into force if 
no objection has been expressed by either the European 
Parliament or the Council. The legislator also has the right to THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 39 
 
revoke the European Commission’s delegated powers at a later 
stage.53 
•  On  implementing Acts, Art. 291 TFEU stipulates that where 
uniform conditions for the implementation of legally binding acts 
are needed, implementation can be undertaken by the European 
Commission or exceptionally by the Council (see Figure 4). Art. 
291 TFEU – unlike Art. 290 TFEU on delegated acts – is not a self-
executing provision. The regulation on the implementing acts sets 
out rules and general principles concerning the mechanisms for 
control by member states of the European Commission’s exercise 
of implementing powers.54 
  
                                                      
53 On 9 December 2009 the European Commission adopted a Communication 
concerning delegated acts (Implementation of Article 290 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union,  COM(2009) 673, Brussels, 9 December 
2009) to ensure a clear understanding with the European Parliament and 
Council on how to use delegated acts. Agreement on a “Common 
Understanding” among the three institutions was reached at the end of 2010.  
54 To this end, on 16 February 2011 the European Parliament and the Council 
adopted Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011 laying down the rules and general 
principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the 
Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (2010/0051/COD). The new 
regulation replaced the ‘Comitology Decision’ adopted by the Council in 1999 
and amended in 2006. Yet beyond their initial role in adopting the regulation, 
Art. 291 TFEU does not foresee the institutional involvement of either the 
Parliament or the Council in the preparation or adoption of implementing acts, 
as the provision explicitly refers to the “member states” in this regard. The new 
regulation foresees only two procedures (“advisory” and “examination”) and 
an automatic alignment of existing comitology procedures (advisory, 
management and regulatory) with the new regulation: all existing advisory 
procedures are to remain advisory, while all the management and regulatory 
procedures are to become “examination” procedures. Concerning delegated 
acts, such an automatism does not exist, but the European Commission has 
committed to aligning old acts now falling under the provisions for delegated 
acts (i.e. most comitology acts adopted by the regulatory procedure with 
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Figure 4.New comitology rules (Art. 191 TFEU) 
 
Source: “Council adopts new ‘comitology’ rules”, Council of the European Union, 
6378/11 Presse 23, Brussels, 14 February 2011. 
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Comitology committees are relatively similar to Council working 
groups as they are composed of EU member state representatives and 
can sometimes resort to voting to take decisions. Yet unlike Council 
working groups, they are not chaired by representatives of the Council 
presidency, but by the European Commission.55 Comitology has at 
times been viewed as going beyond decision-making on 
‘implementation details’, posing questions about the legitimacy and 
transparency of decision-making in the European Union. The new 
regime as outlined above can be understood as a reaction to this 
criticism, as those acts that go beyond mere implementation (i.e. 
delegated acts) are now subject to a veto of both the Council and the 
European Parliament and both institutions can also revoke the 
delegation to the European Commission. 
iv)  Own decision-making authority in the field of competition policy 
In most policy areas, the European Commission only performs a 
supervisory role to check whether member states implement and 
enforce policies properly. With regard to competition policy, the 
European Commission is nonetheless directly and immediately 
responsible for taking decisions on the activities of companies active in 
more than one EU member state. For instance, it can prohibit or alter 
mergers of large multinationals56 or impose very significant fines for 
violating EU competition rules (e.g. collusion or the abuse of a dominant 
position) by companies operating in the EU, irrespective of whether of 
EU or foreign origin. The European Commission can also block member 
states from handing out illegal subsidies to companies, or in cases where 
subsidies have already been paid, force the repayment (Box 4).  
 
 
 
                                                      
55 A list of comitology committees can be found on the European Commission’s 
“Comitology Register” (http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/ 
index.cfm). 
56 In reality and according to procedural rules, the European Commission 
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Box 4. An evolving EU competition policy 
Over the years, the EU’s competition authorities have gradually increased their 
influence. There have been a number of high-profile cases where the European 
Commission has blocked mergers (including of firms headquartered outside 
the EU), fined companies for violation of competition rules or forced member 
states to repay illegal state aid, i.e. subsidies to companies. Controversial cases 
or setbacks in the courts have triggered reform and improved international 
cooperation. 
Typically, the EU fights restrictive practices and cartels, and it hands 
down significant fines, often in the hundreds of millions, to companies in 
various sectors. The record fine to date has amounted to over €1 billion. In the 
field of competition policy, the EU has special investigative rights to undertake 
raids in conjunction with member states’ authorities.  
Other high-profile cases involve mergers. For example, the European 
Commission has blocked the mergers of companies headquartered in the US 
(i.e. the proposed GE–Honeywell merger in early 2000) or forced significant 
concessions (i.e. the Boeing–McDonnell Douglas merger) after the US 
competition authorities had already cleared the cases.  
Box 4 cont’d 
The negative verdicts by the European Court (of First Instance) – under 
the Treaty of Lisbon now called the ‘General Court’ – on three Commission 
decisions blocking mergers (i.e. the respective mergers of Airtours–First Choice, 
Tetra Laval–Sidel and Schneider–Legrand) triggered an in-depth procedural 
revamp of how mergers are examined.  
Another controversial area is control of state aid by member states, 
which potentially distorts competition in the EU internal market. In principle, 
all state aid – i.e. government subsidies over a certain threshold – need to be 
notified to the European Commission, which decides whether the subsidies are 
lawful or not. This regularly leads to high-profile cases between the European 
Commission’s competition authorities and the member states. 
 
v)  External representation of the European Union 
The European Commission represents the EU externally on all matters 
of EU competence other than in the area of CFSP or other fields 
explicitly provided for in the Treaties. Where Union competence is 
exclusive, as in the area of trade, it is the lead negotiator of the EU. At 
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with the Council over the interpretation of the Treaty of Lisbon 
concerning external representation in international negotiations on 
matters falling under ‘shared competence’ (i.e. issues where both EU 
and national policies co-exist).57 Both the European Commission 
President and the President of the European Council take part in the 
meetings of the G-8, the gatherings of leaders of the 7 richest countries 
and Russia, and the G-20. With the Treaty of Lisbon the delegations of 
the European Commission that exist all over the world have become EU 
delegations. Administratively they are to become part of the European 
External Action Service, while staff dealing with issues falling within 
the European Commission’s competence (e.g. trade) continue to report 
to the Commission. (External representation is dealt with in greater 
detail in chapter 11.) 
3.4  The European Parliament 
The European Parliament’s influence on legislation has grown steadily 
during the various treaty revisions, from the Single European Act to the 
Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and now the Lisbon Treaty. The European 
Parliament has taken on the role of co-legislator on an equal footing 
with the Council of Ministers in most policy areas. It also plays a 
significant role in the budget negotiations and has a veto right for most 
international agreements, including enlargement, through the consent 
procedure (i.e. the European Parliament cannot formally suggest any 
amendments, but it can approve or disapprove the text as a whole). 
Notably all agreements that cover policy fields falling under the 
ordinary legislative procedure or the consent procedure (see chapter 4) 
always require the consent of the European Parliament. For other areas, 
such as the CFSP and a limited number of issues in the field of 
agriculture and fisheries,58 the Parliament is only involved in a 
consultative way. The resolutions that it issues in these fields can easily 
be set aside by the Council. 
                                                      
57 As a consequence, the European Commission withdrew the draft negotiation 
directives for an international agreement on mercury that it had proposed to 
the Council. 
58 On fixing prices, levies, aid, quantitative limitations and the fixing and 
allocation of fishing opportunities, see Art. 43(3) TFEU. 44 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
The Parliament currently consists of 736 deputies or MEPs (see 
Table 3 above), as the 2009 elections took place under the old rules of the 
Treaty of Nice. Under the Treaty of Lisbon 751 deputies are foreseen 
and the additional MEPs should take office once the necessary 
provisions are in place.59 MEPs are chosen on the basis of national lists 
(e.g. a German citizen residing in Germany can only vote for candidates 
who are on the list for a German party, but they do not need to be of 
German nationality). After the elections the national political parties join 
forces in European political groups. The Parliament decides by a 
majority of its members,60 but – like the other EU institutions – it is a 
consensus-driven body. Despite the presence of two large political 
groups, the centre-right European People’s Party (Christian Democrats 
and Conservatives) and the centre-left Socialist and Democrats Party, 
neither is large enough to form a majority on its own (see Table 5). 
Hence, coalition building is a neces s i t y  t o  a p p r o v e ,  r e j e c t  o r  a m e n d  
legislation.61 Most of the legislation is discussed and shaped in 
                                                      
59 As Germany is set to lose 3 MEPs under the Treaty of Lisbon compared with 
the Treaty of Nice (96 instead of 99), but all current MEPs have been elected 
under the Treaty of Nice for a full five-year term, the total number of MEPs will 
temporarily (i.e. for the rest of the 2009–14 parliamentary term) reach 754 when 
the additional 18 MEPs foreseen under the Treaty of Lisbon take office. As the 
Treaty only allows a maximum of 751, however, the Treaty must be changed in 
order to allow for the 18 MEPs to take office during the current parliamentary 
term. This Treaty change was agreed by all member states in July 2010, but at 
the time of writing the ratification process had not yet been concluded. 
60 In the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure, the European 
Parliament decides by a simple majority of all MEPs present at the plenary 
vote. Yet in the second reading, the European Parliament must decide by an 
absolute majority of its members. This creates an incentive to reach agreement 
during the first reading. 
61 Different winning coalitions are possible. According to “EU Vote Watch” 
(http://www.votewatch.eu) – a website monitoring the European Parliament – 
on economic issues the winning coalition consists of ALDE (liberal) and the 
EPP (centre-right), whereas on social issues and personal freedoms the EPP 
tends to give ground to the wider centre-left coalition of socialists/social 
democrats, liberals and greens. This would give the liberal group the role of 
‘kingmaker’ in this European Parliament. c
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Box 5.The European Parliament: Committees and delegations 
Foreign Affairs (AFET) with Human Rights (DROI) and Security and 
Defence (SEDE) Sub-committees 
Development (DEVE) 
International Trade (INTA) 
Budget (BUDG) 
Budgetary Control (CONT) 
Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) 
Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) 
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) 
Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) 
Transport and Tourism (TRAN) 
Regional Development (REGI) 
Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) 
Fisheries (PECH) 
Culture and Education (CULT) 
Legal Affairs (JURI) 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) 
Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) 
Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) 
Petitions (PETI) 
 
These can be complemented by special or temporary committees. 
The committees are complemented with 35-40 joint parliamentary 
committees, cooperation committees or interparliamentary delegations with 
almost all major countries or regional blocs in Europe and beyond.  
In addition, MEPS of different political groups create ‘inter-groups’ to 
advance specific issues.  
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In recent years, the European Parliament has acted with increasing 
self-confidence, for example on important files and issues like the 
chemicals directive REACH, the services directive, and the climate 
action and renewable energy package. The European Parliament has 
also been very self-confident about exercising the new powers it has 
obtained under the Treaty of Lisbon. Within a couple of weeks after the 
Treaty’s entry into force Parliament threatened to veto a free trade 
agreement with South Korea and successfully demanded an additional 
safeguard regulation. It also rejected a first draft of the SWIFT 
agreement (concerning the access of US authorities to the banking data 
of EU citizens).  
The hearings of Commissioners-designate have become another 
opportunity for the European Parliament to demonstrate its increased 
powers. As the European Parliament cannot send individual 
Commissioners home, it successfully threatened to veto the entire 
College of Commissioners in 2004, when a majority of socialists and 
liberals was not convinced by the hearing of the Commissioner-
designate from Italy, Rocco Buttiglione. Similarly it threatened to reject 
the proposed College because of the Bulgarian candidate for 
Commissioner, Rumiana Jeleva, in 2009.  
As an ultimate instrument vis-à-vis the European Commission, 
the European Parliament has a motion of censure for the Commission at 
its disposal. It has never actually censored a European Commission, but 
successfully threatened to do so in 1999, as a result of which the Santer 
Commission stepped down after allegations of fraud.  
3.5  The Court of Justice of the European Union 
The Court of Justice of the European Union – often referred to as the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) – dates back to the ECSC Treaty of 1952 
and it is located in Luxembourg. Its mission is to ensure the coherent 
interpretation and application of EU legislation across all member 
states. It is composed of one judge from each member state, but it 
usually sits as a Grand Chamber of thirteen judges or in chambers of 
five or three judges. The Court is assisted by eight advocates-general 
who present reasoned opinions on the cases brought before the Court. 
Judges and advocates-general are impartial and they are appointed by 
joint agreement among the member states for a term of six years 
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In 1988 a Court of First Instance was created to help the ECJ cope 
with the large number of cases brought before it. With the Treaty of 
Lisbon it was renamed the General Court. It deals with cases brought by 
private individuals and companies as well as cases relating to 
competition law. The European Union Civil Service Tribunal 
(established in 2005) is responsible for disputes between the EU and its 
civil servants. 
The following five kinds of cases are the most common: 
•  references for a preliminary ruling (Art. 267 TFEU), 
•  actions for failure to fulfil an obligation (Arts. 258 and 259 TFEU), 
•  actions for annulment (Art. 263 TFEU), 
•  actions for failure to act (Art. 265 TFEU), and 
•  actions for damages (Art. 268 TFEU).62 
The Court has proved to be of crucial importance for the European 
integration process. In the past a series of Court rulings established the 
primacy of Union law over national law. This principle is implicit in the 
Treaties, but only the Court made it explicit.63 The Court also 
established the direct applicability (or ‘direct effect’) of EU law.64 As a 
consequence, Union law can directly impose obligations on individuals 
and likewise confer rights on them, which they can invoke before 
national courts and the ECJ. Hence, this ‘direct effect’ allows them to 
take advantage of Union provisions regardless of their transposition 
into national law. The common foreign and security policy remains 
largely excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction. As regards the former 
third pillar (i.e. police and judicial cooperation on criminal matters) only 
very few limitations remain.65 
                                                      
62 A more detailed explanation of all procedures can be found on the European 
Commission’s website, “European institutions and bodies”, “The Court of 
Justice” (http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/justice/index_en.htm). 
63 See Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
64 See Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration 
[1963] ECR 1. 
65 The Court continues to have no jurisdiction on the validity and 
proportionality of police operations and measures taken by the member states 
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EU citizens and entities do not necessarily have to go to the Court 
in Luxembourg, as European law is safeguarded by national judges who 
look at earlier verdicts regarding possible violations of European law or 
put a prejudicial question to the European Court of Justice.  
3.6  Other institutions and bodies 
Other institutions and bodies include the following: 
•  The Court of Auditors in Luxembourg achieved the status of an 
institution with the Maastricht Treaty. It examines the accounts of 
the Union’s revenue and expenditures and checks whether 
financial management is sound. It reports to the European 
Parliament. 
•  The  European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt gained 
institutional status with the Treaty of Lisbon, but it continues to 
retain its own legal personality and its independence vis-à-vis the 
other institutions and the member states. The ECB is in charge of 
the management of the EU’s common currency. 
•  The  European Investment Bank in Luxembourg provides low 
interest loans to poorer regions both within the Union and outside 
it (e.g. to developing countries from the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific region and the EU’s candidate, associated and 
neighbourhood countries). 
•  The European Economic and Social Committee in Brussels has an 
advisory role and gives opinions on matters concerning the social 
partners (labour and employers organisations).  
•  The Committee of the Regions in Brussels is another EU advisory 
body that deals with issues of concern for the European regions. It 
was created by the Treaty of Maastricht. 
                                                                                                                                 
to maintain law and order or to safeguard internal security. For acts adopted 
prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (i.e. still under the rules of the 
former third pillar) the limited powers of the Court of Justice remain 
unchanged for a transition period of five years, unless the act is amended 
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•  The European Ombudsman in Strasbourg investigates complaints 
about maladministration in the institutions and bodies of the EU. 
The ombudsman does not have legal powers, but can report non-
compliance with its advice to the European Parliament.  
3.7  Summary: Essential aspects of the EU’s institutional set-up 
As the initiator of legislation, the European Commission plays a central 
role as an agenda-setter in the European decision-making process. It is 
generally receptive to external recommendations and maintains close 
ties with national experts and policy-makers (at the EU and national 
levels) as well as with the various stakeholders potentially concerned by 
European legislation (see also chapter 10 on interest representation). The 
European Commission is always represented at meetings of the Council 
of Ministers and the European Commission President takes part in all 
meetings of the European Council. In the CFSP the European 
Commission plays a much more limited role.  
Final decisions are generally taken by the Council of Ministers and 
the European Parliament, at least in the many areas where the ordinary 
legislative procedure (co-decision) applies (Figure 5). Where national 
vetoes have been abolished in the Council (i.e. where qualified majority 
voting applies), national governments are forced to reach real 
compromise. Negotiations continue to be dominated by a spirit of 
cooperation where preference is given to reaching a consensus that is 
acceptable to all delegations. In areas where unanimity is required (e.g. 
in the area of taxation), decisions tend to be based on the lowest 
common denominator, such that major steps towards European 
integration seldom take place. Most of the Council’s work is 
accomplished by Council working groups (composed of national civil 
servants and diplomats) and within COREPER (the body bringing 
together EU ambassadors or deputy ambassadors). As it is familiar with 
the situation in both the member states and the Council, COREPER is 
usually well placed to judge what can realistically be achieved. 
The European Parliament is the institution that has seen the 
greatest increase in competences with the successive treaty reforms. 
Under the ordinary legislative procedure it is an equal legislator to the 
member states in the Council. As the only EU institution directly elected 
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European decision-making process, but faces the challenge of a 
relatively low turnout in European elections.66 
Other bodies such as the Committee of the Regions and the much 
older Economic and Social Committee are merely consultative but in 
certain cases can help to shape an agenda or influence the decision-
making process.  
Figure 5. The European institutions – Overview 
 
  
                                                      
66 Voter turnout at the European parliamentary elections has seen a steady 
decline from a high of 62% in the first direct elections for the European 
Parliament in 1979 (for the EU-9) to 50% in 1999 (EU-15) and 43% in 2009 (EU-
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4.  How the EU legislates 
Decision-making in the EU is highly complex. This is no different from 
national decision-making. One difference, however, is that EU decision-
making has evolved considerably in line with progress on integration, 
thus underlining the EU’s nature as an ever-changing Union. 
Established procedures are adapted quickly when a new treaty enters 
into force.67 
This chapter does not go into detail about the formal procedures, 
as these are discussed in textbooks about European integration.68 
Instead it outlines the key features for understanding the basics. The 
chapter should be read in conjunction with the preceding chapter on the 
EU institutions, where the roles of the various institutions in the 
decision-making process are described in greater detail.  
4.1  Legal acts of the Union 
Legal acts of the EU can take different forms: regulations, directives, 
decisions, recommendations and opinions (Art. 288 TFEU).69 While the 
first three are binding, recommendations and opinions do not have 
binding force.  
                                                      
67 For example, when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the European 
Commission published a Communication (Consequences of the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon for ongoing inter-institutional decision-making 
procedures,  COM(2009) 665 final, Brussels, 2 December 2009) explaining its 
position on all pending legislative procedures. The proposals made under the 
rules of the third pillar were withdrawn. The European Parliament reacted with 
a resolution on 5 May 2010 demanding a new proposal on 10 additional files 
and announcing a new first reading concerning 4 procedures that had changed 
under the Treaty of Lisbon, while confirming its position on 29 procedures. 
68 See for instance, Bomberg et al. (2008), op. cit., (ch. 7); Dinan (2010), op. cit.; 
and Nugent (2010), op. cit. 
69 The Lisbon Treaty has abolished the specific instruments that were used in 
the third pillar covering police and judicial cooperation on criminal matters, 
which were called ‘common positions’, ‘framework decisions’ and 
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The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a clear distinction between 
legislative acts on the one hand (i.e. acts to be adopted by the ordinary 
or a special legislative procedure, as explicitly indicated by the 
respective Treaty provision) and non-legislative acts on the other (Art. 
289(3) TFEU). Legislative acts have to take the form of regulations, 
directives or decisions. Non-legislative acts can be legally binding (e.g. 
‘delegated acts’ or ‘implementing acts’, see above subsection 3.3.2(iii)) or 
not (recommendations or opinions). In the area of CFSP, legislative acts 
are explicitly excluded (Art. 24(1), second subparagraph TEU). With the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon all acts adopted under CFSP are 
now called ‘decisions’ (Art. 25 TEU).70 
The next two subsections outline the legal acts that exist under the 
Treaty of Lisbon. 
4.1.1 Legislative acts 
•  Regulations are addressed to all member states and persons in the 
EU and are directly binding in their entirety, which would mean 
in principle that no national legislation is needed for 
implementation. Still, in practice national legislation frequently 
has to be changed or removed in order to comply with 
regulations.  
•  Directives are addressed to all or a specified number of member 
states. They normally just define the objectives and results to be 
achieved, and they require transposition into national law by a 
fixed date (e.g. two years). Failing this, recourse to the General 
Court or the Court of Justice is possible for reasons of non-
implementation.  
Decisions are addressed to particular member states, companies 
or private individuals, and are binding upon those to whom they are 
addressed. Many are issued by the European Commission and typically 
concern cases of state aid and competition.  
Although there are more regulations and decisions in quantitative 
t e r m s ,  d i r e c t i v e s  t e n d  t o  b e  c o n s i d ered the ‘most important tools’ as 
                                                      
70 Decisions have replaced the previous set of instruments, which were called 
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they are often particularly significant in terms of impact. But this does 
not exclude that regulations and decisions can also have a high impact. 
4.1.2 Non-legislative acts 
•  Delegated acts are legally binding acts that are adopted by the 
European Commission. They are acts of general application to 
supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of a 
legislative act. This legislative act (which is always required as a 
legal basis for the delegated act) must explicitly lay down the 
conditions to which the delegation is subject. A delegated act may 
only enter into force if neither the European Parliament nor the 
Council have objected to it; both institutions may also revoke the 
delegation to the European Commission altogether. 
•  Implementing acts are legally binding acts that confer 
implementing powers on the European Commission, or in specific 
cases on the Council, where uniform conditions for implementing 
legally binding Union acts are needed. The exercise of the 
European Commission’s implementing powers is controlled by 
member states through the comitology committees (see subsection 
3.3.2(iii)). 
•  Recommendations and opinions give non-binding views on a 
number of topics, normally to encourage desirable, but not legally 
enforceable, good practice throughout the Union. 
Communications,  White Papers and Green Papers are not 
considered ‘legal acts’ according to the Treaties. The European 
Commission can issue them in all policy areas. They are non-binding 
but can have considerable influence since they help to formulate policy. 
Communications usually describe the status quo of a policy area with or 
without putting forward possible options. Green Papers usually launch 
a wide consultation process, while White Papers outline a more or less 
agreed policy and therefore make it easy to ‘read’ this policy. In reality, 
however, the boundaries between the three are often more blurred. 
4.2  How acts are adopted 
The main actors in the formal decision-making process are the Council 
of Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament. 
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Commission proposed, the European Parliament amended and the 
Council disposed (either by unanimity or by qualified majority, 
depending on the subject). Yet over time, the Parliament has obtained 
true co-decision power in a great number of areas. This means that 
instead of the traditional division with the Parliament amending and the 
Council disposing, both now jointly have to agree in most cases, if 
necessary in a conciliation procedure (as discussed below).71 Procedures 
differ according to two criteria: 
•  the powers of the European Parliament, and  
•  the question of whether majority voting or unanimity is required 
in the Council. 
4.2.1   Legislative procedures 
The Treaties distinguish between the ordinary legislative procedure (co-
decision) and various ‘special legislative procedures’. 
The point of departure is normally a legislative proposal from the 
European Commission that is then subject to approval, rejection or 
amendments either by both the European Parliament and the Council or 
– exceptionally – by the Council alone.  
i)  Ordinary legislative procedure 
The European Parliament is strongest under the ordinary legislative 
procedure, as it grants Parliament powers equal to those of the Council 
(see Figure 6 and appendix 2). The procedure is essentially what was 
known as the ‘co-decision procedure’ before the Treaty of Lisbon. It is 
now the default (and therefore ‘ordinary’) legislative procedure of the 
EU and the only one explicitly outlined in the Treaty (Art. 294 TFEU). In 
the years before the Treaty of Lisbon, co-decision had already been the 
most important procedure, in terms of both its frequency of use and the 
significance of the decisions made. Co-decision was introduced by the 
Treaty of Maastricht and its field of application has been extended with 
every subsequent treaty reform (i.e. Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon). 
                                                      
71 See P.M. Kaczyński et al., The Treaty of Lisbon: A Second Look at the Institutional 
Innovations, Joint study by the Centre for European Policy Studies, Egmont and 
the European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2010. 56 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
Initially, it was feared that co-decision would make decision-making too 
complicated, but practice showed that the procedure worked well, 
although somewhat slowly during the first years. This prompted the 
member states to attach a protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty adjuring 
the Council, Commission and European Parliament to use this 
procedure as speedily as possible. As a result, many decisions are taken 
using an informal fast-track procedure with consultations between the 
Council and the Parliament reduced to one reading (instead of two or 
three) in practice (through ‘trilogues’). Since 2004 a considerable 
increase in agreements reached during the first reading has been 
observed (from one-third to more than two-thirds of all legislation 
agreed under co-decision),72 which has led to growing concern among 
MEPs about too many ‘quick deal’ agreements that may come at the 
disadvantage of the European Parliament.73 
If the Council and European Parliament cannot agree during the 
first two readings, they have a last chance to do so in a conciliation 
committee, where selected representatives from the Council and the 
Parliament plus the European Commission try to reach agreement 
(although for the most part these actors convene at earlier stages of the 
process in the informal trilogues). If the conciliation committee reaches 
an agreement, the member states in the Council and the parliamentary 
plenary have to decide upon it. If no agreement is reached at that stage, 
then the legislative proposal has finally failed to be adopted (see 
appendix 2). This is not often the case, however. Of the eight legislative 
texts that were agreed in the conciliation committee in 2009, all have 
been approved subsequently by the Council and European Parliament 
in a third reading.74 
                                                      
72 See the website of the European Commission, “Co-decision”, “Statistics”, 30 
July 2010 (http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/statistics/index_en.htm). 
73  See S. Taylor, “MEPs quick-deal concerns: Deputies fear that co-decision 
deals with the Council could lead to poorer quality legislation”, European Voice, 
17-23 January 2008, p. 4. 
74 See website of the European Commission, “Co-decision”, “Overview of Co-
Decision Procedures Concluded on Conciliation” 30 July 2010 
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Figure 6. Schematic overview of the ordinary legislative procedure 
Note: See also appendix 2. 
ii)  Special legislative procedures 
There are several special legislative procedures that are not explicitly 
outlined in the Treaties.75 
•  The consent procedure gives the European Parliament a right to 
accept or reject a particular proposal. It covers only a small 
number of legislative areas, such as combating discrimination 
(Art. 19(1) TFEU), extending citizenship-related rights (Art. 25 
                                                      
75 Art. 289(2) TFEU only refers to them as procedures for the adoption of a 
legislative act by the Council with the participation of the European Parliament, 
and by the European Parliament with the participation of the Council. 
Note that the cooperation procedure (ex-Art. 252 TEC) has been abolished with 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Under the Treaty of Nice it was only applied to very few 
cases in the field of Economic and Monetary Union. 
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TFEU) and adopting the multi-annual financial framework (Art. 
312(2) TFEU). The Council acts unanimously in all of these cases.76 
The consent of the European Parliament is often also required in 
the context of non-legislative procedures, such as EU enlargement 
(e.g. adhesion treaties for new member states) and association or 
trade agreements with non-EU countries. The Treaty of Lisbon has 
extended the requirement of the European Parliament’s consent to 
the conclusion of most international agreements.77 
•  The European Parliament is weakest under the consultation 
procedure,78 which merely requires its non-binding opinion.79 
Although its rights in areas falling under this procedure are very 
limited, it still has the (political) possibility to link them to areas 
falling under the ordinary legislative procedure or to its budgetary 
powers. Without the European Parliament’s agreement, there is no 
budget, and it has used this power in the past to extend its 
influence in other areas.  
                                                      
76 The only case where the Council acts by qualified majority in the context of a 
legislative  procedure and where the European Parliament has to give its 
consent, concerns implementing measures of the Union’s own resources system 
(Art. 311, para. 4 TFEU). 
77 See Art. 218(6)(v) TFEU, which stipulates that agreements require the 
European Parliament’s consent if they cover policy fields to which either the 
ordinary legislative procedure or the consent procedure applies. This means 
that notably all trade agreements require the European Parliament’s consent. 
78 When a legislative procedure requires consultation of the European 
Parliament, the Council normally acts unanimously. In the framework of a 
legislative procedure there are only three cases for which the Council acts with 
qualified majority when the European Parliament is consulted:  
•  measures to facilitate diplomatic protection (Art. 23 TFEU); 
•  research, i.e. specific programmes implementing the framework 
programme (Art. 182(4) TFEU); and 
•  measures concerning the outermost regions (Art. 349 TFEU). 
79 Still, according to an ECJ ruling (in the ‘Isoglucose’ Case 138/79, Roquette 
Frères v. Council [1980] ECR 3333) “due consultation” of the European 
Parliament constitutes an essential formality. Disregard of this formality means 
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4.2.2  Non-legislative procedures 
Some legally binding acts are adopted through a non-legislative 
procedure. Such a procedure can involve both the Council of Ministers 
and the European Commission (e.g. a common customs tariff, Art. 31 
TFEU), the Commission alone (e.g. undertakings with a special position, 
Art. 106(3) TFEU) or the Commission, social partners and the Council 
(agreements in the area of social policy, Arts 154 and 155 TFEU). 
Delegated and implementing acts are also legally binding acts that 
are adopted according to non-legislative procedures. The same is true 
for the conclusion of international agreements (see the discussion in 
subsection 4.2.1(ii) above). 
5.  What is the difference between the EU and a federal state? 
The EU is often wrongly compared with a classic federation like the US, 
Germany or Switzerland. Federations tend to have a separation of 
powers among the different levels of government and a clear distinction 
of the competences of the various institutional actors. Neither is true for 
the EU, however, where power is dispersed across the institutions. The 
European Commission, the member states and the European Parliament 
must interact as partners in drafting, adopting, implementing and 
enforcing legislation. Although the European Commission has the right 
of initiative, it consults closely with member states and (where the 
ordinary legislative procedure applies) with the European Parliament 
when drafting legislation. During the decision-making phase the 
European Commission participates in the deliberations and negotiations 
among member states. While it does not have a vote, the European 
Commission still plays a crucial role at this stage. And although the 
Parliament will only formally decide after the Council has taken its 
decision, the Parliament will have already been consulted informally. 
Once the decision has been adopted (by the Council and Parliament), 
member states and the European Commission must jointly implement 
the decision. With delegated acts the European Commission can 
supplement or amend non-essential elements of a legislative act (see 
section 3.3.2(iii)), but the Parliament and the Council both have a right 
to veto such an act or even revoke the delegation altogether. In addition, 
given its extended powers in many areas, confrontation with the 
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can still backfire for the Council or the European Commission in another 
area where the Parliament does have such power (e.g. on budgetary 
aspects). Thus, in reality at every level and in every phase of the 
decision-making process, the powers of the European Commission, 
member states and the European Parliament are mixed. At times 
national governments present themselves as being in opposition to the 
EU, but they are just as much a part of the EU decision-making process 
as the European Commission and the European Parliament.  
Another feature that distinguishes the EU from most (federal) 
states is its strong focus on consensus building and the avoidance of 
decisions based on simple majorities. The EU decision-making process 
usually requires large coalitions. Majorities are not stable (i.e. no 
‘government vs. opposition’) as they shift from issue to issue. The 
decision-making process is based on power sharing between institutions 
and requires mutual trust among the actors. For example, in the 
Council, a sense of constructive cooperation usually prevails over power 
struggles among countries and the concerns of smaller member states 
are traditionally respected. The wider public sometimes perceives the 
EU decision-making process as opaque, slow and seemingly inefficient, 
but it produces lasting decisions that are acceptable in a diverse range of 
national contexts. This process additionally enhances the prospects for 
coherent implementation across the EU.  
6.  Does the EU suffer from a ‘democratic deficit’ and does the 
Treaty of Lisbon make the EU more democratic? 
For many years there has been a controversial debate, in both academic 
circles and in the wider public, on whether the EU has sufficient 
democratic legitimacy for its often far-reaching decisions.80 Owing to the 
Union’s distinct sui generis character, it is not easy (nor sensible) to apply 
the same standards and mechanisms that apply to a nation state on the 
one hand or to a traditional international organisation on the other. The 
EU has considerably more powers than most international organisations 
(e.g. the European Commission’s (sole) right of initiative in its areas of 
                                                      
80 See also S. Hix, What’s wrong with the European Union and how to fix it, 1st 
edition, Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008. THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 61 
 
competence or the abolition of national vetoes in the Council on many 
policy issues), but it also has considerably fewer powers than a nation 
state (e.g. no competences to attribute itself competences, to raise taxes 
or to direct an army). In addition, the EU has to act in a context where it 
cannot count on a common public forum, as the national level remains 
predominant with respect to media attention and citizens’ identity. It is 
therefore difficult to envisage enhancing the EU’s legitimacy with the 
introduction of a majoritarian system as known in most member states. 
The complex political context of the EU is therefore reflected in its entire 
decision-making system: at the beginning of a legislative procedure is a 
proposal from the European Commission, and thus it arises from the 
institution that is best placed to represent the general ‘Union interest’ 
and not a specific national or party-political preference. Decisions in the 
Council are in practice often taken by consensus and even in the case of 
a vote, not just a simple but rather a qualified majority must be reached. 
This qualified majority is calculated according to a double-majority 
system, which again reflects the particular respect for minority 
positions. In the European Parliament the allocation of seats is 
digressively proportionate to the size of the country from which 
representatives originate in order to guarantee that citizens from the 
smallest countries have a meaningful number of deputies. 
The Treaty of Lisbon has not put into question this sui generis 
character of the Union, but departing from this assumption, it has 
enhanced the democratic legitimacy of the Union in a number of ways: 
•  The Treaty explicitly stresses the values of the EU, which for 
example provide guidance to the legislative proposals of the 
European Commission or the rulings of the European Court of 
Justice. As such, the Treaty states that the Union is founded on the 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights (Art. 2 TEU). 
•  The Treaty of Lisbon has also introduced a separate title on 
“Democratic Principles” that regroups and highlights all 
respective provisions. Notably it states that every citizen shall 
have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union 
and that decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as 
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•  Besides these horizontal provisions, the Treaty strengthens 
democracy at three levels:  
−  at the EU level by giving the European Parliament more 
competences,  
−  at the member state level by strengthening control of 
national parliaments, and  
−  directly at the citizens’ level through the introduction of the 
European Citizens’ Initiative and through the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights becoming legally binding. 
•  As concerns the European Parliament, the only directly elected 
EU institution has become an equal co-legislator to the national 
ministers in the Council on almost all policy areas (e.g. newly 
including large parts of agricultural policy, trade policy and the 
area of freedom, security and justice). Additionally, the approval 
of the Parliament is now needed for all international treaties that 
cover matters falling under the ordinary legislative procedure or 
the consent procedure (which is one of the special legislative 
procedures, see above 4.2.1 (ii)). It has increased budgetary 
powers for the annual budget, giving the European Parliament the 
final word on all categories of spending. Following the 
parliamentary elections, the European Parliament formally elects 
the President of the European Commission. A direct link between 
the outcome of the parliamentary elections and the President of 
the EU’s main executive body is thus established. Finally, the 
European Parliament is likely to play a greater role during future 
treaty revisions. Most importantly, it may submit proposals for the 
amendment of the Treaties to the Council. Before the Treaty of 
Lisbon, only national governments or the European Commission 
were entitled to do so. 
•  As  national parliaments remain the focal points for political 
debate in the member states, they are of key importance to 
stimulate discussion on European issues and foster a better 
understanding of EU decisions in national publics. The Treaty of 
Lisbon has introduced a new article (Art. 12 TEU) that sets out 
their rights and functions in relation to the Union, covering for 
example the information they receive, the review of the 
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freedom, security and justice as well as the revision of the Treaties. 
Maybe most importantly, the Protocol on the Application of the 
Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality has been amended 
to allow closer scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle by national 
parliaments.81 Any national parliament can also block a 
unanimous decision by member states intended to shift decision-
making from the unanimity rule to qualified majority voting (so-
called ‘passerelle clauses’).82 Finally yet importantly, national 
parliaments are set to play an even greater role during future 
treaty reforms. While before they were already central actors 
during the ratification phase, the Treaty of Lisbon has introduced 
                                                      
81 Under this ‘early-warning system’, any national parliament may, within eight 
weeks of the last language version of a legislative proposal being ready, issue a 
reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the proposal does not comply 
with the principle of subsidiarity.  
•  If the reasoned opinion represents at least one-third of the votes allocated to 
national parliaments, the author of the proposal (primarily the European 
Commission) must review the text. Following this review, the author may 
decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft. Reasons must be given for 
this decision (’yellow card’). 
•  If, under the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision), the legislative 
proposal is challenged by a simple majority of the votes allocated to national 
parliaments and if the European Commission decides to maintain its 
proposal regardless, a special procedure comes into play. The European 
Commission has to issue a reasoned opinion explaining how the principle of 
subsidiarity is being respected. This opinion is sent to the legislator (the 
Council and European Parliament), together with the reasoned opinions of 
the national parliaments. The legislator may then decide (by 55% of the 
members of the Council or by a majority of the votes cast in the European 
Parliament) not to continue with the legislative procedure. This mechanism 
ensures closer scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle without, however, 
undermining the European Commission’s right of initiative (‘orange card’).  
82 National parliaments can veto such a move in the area of family law with 
cross-border implications (e.g. legislation on bi-national marriages) or some 
future treaty revisions (but only the ‘ordinary’ revisions and not the ‘simplified’ 
smaller treaty changes, which do not increase the powers allocated to the Union 
and are limited to Part III TFEU on internal policies). 64 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
a convention as part of the ordinary treaty revision procedure. In 
such a convention national parliaments will be represented, as 
was the case for the Convention on the Future of Europe in   
2002–03. 
•  For the first time, the EU Treaties also include an instrument of 
direct democracy: the European Citizens’ Initiative, giving one 
million citizens from one quarter of the member states (i.e. 
currently seven)83 the possibility to ‘invite’ the European 
Commission to make a legislative proposal on issues that fall 
within the remit of its competence to implement the Treaties (e.g. 
consumer protection, environmental standards or working 
conditions). The ultimate decision to make a proposal remains 
with the European Commission, but it will justify itself with a 
Communication if it decides not to take action. The European 
Citizens’ Initiative is less of a legal instrument than a tool to 
increase political debate and pressure for action. 
•  Finally there are two other innovations that enhance citizens’ 
rights vis-à-vis EU institutions: the fact that the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights has become legally binding and the foreseen 
accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).  
−  The Charter of Fundamental Rights sets out in a single text 
the full range of civil, political, economic and social rights of 
European citizens and all persons resident in the EU. A first 
version had already been adopted in 2000, but it had only a 
declaratory character. The Charter is not an integral part of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, but the Treaty contains a reference to 
the Charter, which makes it legally binding. This means that 
the Charter has to be observed by all institutions and bodies 
of the EU as well as by member states when they are 
                                                      
83 The Treaty (Art. 11 TEU) requires “a significant number of Member States”, 
which has been determined as one quarter in the regulation establishing the 
procedures and conditions required for a citizens’ initiative. The regulation was 
signed on 16 February 2011 by the Council and Parliament. Member states now 
have 12 months to adjust their national regulations, so that the first collection of 
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implementing EU law. Its provisions shall not extend in any 
way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties, 
however (Art. 6(1) TEU). 
−  The Treaty of Lisbon has also introduced a new legal basis 
that allows for the accession of the EU to the ECHR, to 
which all member states are already party. When the EU 
accedes to the ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg will be able to scrutinise compliance of the 
EU’s acts with the Convention. Accession will additionally 
provide a new possibility for legal remedies for 
individuals.84 
The challenge of how to close the gap between the EU institutions 
and citizens remains and it may even become one of the dominant 
questions for the Union’s future. The Treaty of Lisbon in itself does not 
solve the problem alone, yet it offers a number of instruments that 
improve on the situation.  
7.  Key concepts and principles of the EU 
The Treaty on European Union contains two provisions highlighting the 
values (Art. 2 TEU)85 and objectives (Art. 3 TEU)86 of the Union. They 
                                                      
84 Accession negotiations between the EU and the Council of Europe started on 
7 July 2010.  
85 The values are respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. Art. 2 TEU (as revised by the Treaty of Lisbon) states 
that these values are common to the member states in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between men and women prevail. 
86 The objectives of the Union mentioned in Art. 3 TEU are more numerous and 
broader in scope than those listed in ex-Art. 2 TEU (i.e. before the Treaty of 
Lisbon). Art. 3 TEU includes for example peace, full employment, sustainable 
development, cultural diversity, solidarity, cohesion and protection of citizens. 
By contrast, the principle of “free and undistorted competition” already set out 
in ex-Arts. 3 and 4 of the EC Treaty, is not mentioned among the objectives of 
the Union, as competition is not an end in itself. This does not affect the scope 
or specific weight of the competition rules, however, as they are highlighted in 
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guide the EU institutions when legislating and implementing EU law, as 
well as the European Court of Justice when it issues rulings. The values 
of the Union also constitute the reference framework for future 
accessions to the Union, and for any sanctions on member states that 
infringe those values in a serious and persistent manner (Art. 7 TEU).  
At the same time, the following list – mostly relating to the 
traditional, economic integration objectives – goes beyond these two 
articles. The EU as a highly decentralised and emerging political system 
is founded on a number of key concepts and principles. Taking a closer 
look at them should allow a better understanding of the EU’s essence.87 
•  The principle of sincere cooperation (Art. 4(3) TEU) commits the 
member states and the Union to assisting each other in carrying 
out the tasks resulting from the Treaties. This is particularly 
important given the high level of decentralisation in the EU (see 
chapter 5). Consequently, if member states (in the Council) fail to 
act, Art. 265 TFEU offers the possibility to bring an action before 
the European Court of Justice, an instrument that has been used 
very successfully in the past. The principle of sincere cooperation 
is further reflected in the implementation of Union law. Although 
the European Commission and the Court have the right to control 
implementation and enforcement, without full cooperation of the 
member states the EU legal system could not function.  
•  Non-discrimination as to nationality (Art. 18 TFEU) ties the hands of 
member states in promoting national solutions that would come at 
the expense of other member states. The application of this 
principle has been enforced by a constant review of national 
legislation as to potential restrictions for other EU nationals. This 
has resulted in ensuring the free movement of goods and services 
and the right of establishment. EU citizens are free to choose 
where they want to live and work.  
                                                                                                                                 
the new Protocol on the Internal Market and Competition (which has the same 
legal value as the Treaties).  
87 Most principles are discussed in greater detail in J. Pelkmans, European 
Integration – Methods and Economic Analysis, 3rd edition, Pearson Education, 
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•  The principle of conferral (Art. 5(2) TEU) determines that the Union 
shall only act within the limits of the competences conferred upon 
it by the member states. Competences that are not explicitly 
agreed in the Treaties by all member states remain in the national 
domain. The EU thus has no competence to attribute itself 
additional competences (referred to as ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’). 
Art. 352 TFEU provides a legal base for new competences, 
however, if member states agree unanimously and “if action by 
the Union should prove necessary to attain one of the objectives 
set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the 
necessary powers”. Notably, measures in the area of CFSP are 
explicitly excluded in Art. 352(4) TFEU. 
•  The  subsidiarity and proportionality principles (Arts 5(3) and (4) 
TEU)88 deal with the proper exercise of EU competences or 
authority. Both are used to identify the proper level of 
government in a multi-tier system. According to this principle an 
issue should only be tackled at the EU level if it cannot be done 
just as effectively at the national level. The principle of 
proportionality demands that all measures taken by the EU be 
proportionate to reaching the aims of the Treaties. 
A general guiding principle is the respect of the acquis 
communautaire, as the EU is a union based on law. The acquis includes 
the complete body of EU legislation, including secondary and case law. 
All the member states have to comply with it, unless they have 
                                                      
88 Art. 5(3) TEU states, 
[u]nder the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within 
its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local 
level, but can rather, by reason of the scale of effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level.  
Art. 5(4) TEU states,  
[u]nder the principle of proportionality, the content and form of 
Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
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negotiated an opt-out.89 The notion of the acquis communautaire is 
particularly important in the context of EU enlargement, as new 
members have to accept the full acquis. Although new members might 
get transition periods for implementation, they will not be granted 
permanent opt-outs (e.g. like the UK and Denmark regarding the single 
currency). 
8.  The EU budget 
‘Rules, not money’ is an implicit principle defining the EU as a 
regulatory body and not a big spender. Government functions that 
typically require large resources (social benefits, defence, education or 
pensions) have remained in national hands (see also chapter 9 on the 
euro). If the EU engages in policy areas through common policies, its 
involvement is mainly in the regulatory field. Only in the fields of 
agriculture and regional policy (structural funds and the cohesion 
fund) can resources be termed substantial. For the 2007–13 period, 
agriculture and structural funds made up nearly 70% of the total 
budget, almost equally shared between the two.90 
The high shares allocated to agriculture and regional policy can 
partly be explained by equity considerations. Agricultural spending 
addresses – among other issues – income discrepancies within the 
sector while the structural funds address those between nations, which 
have emerged with subsequent enlargements. Finally, in the past the 
structure of the EU’s budget was influenced by the need to ensure that 
all member states agree on two fundamental EU objectives: the internal 
market and monetary union. Historically the compensatory aspect of 
the EU budget is perhaps best understood if placed in the context of 
negotiations on a multilateral agreement.91 
                                                      
89 An ‘opt-out’ refers to a member state having negotiated for a particular treaty 
provision(s) to not apply to it. 
90 Agricultural policy falls under budget heading 2, “preservation and 
management of natural resources”, from which around 9% has to be subtracted 
for rural development. 
91 The net balance disputes emerging with great regularity throughout each 
negotiation cycle fit best into game theory models on political power. See H. 
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The annual EU budget falls within a longer-term financial 
framework jointly agreed by the European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The current agreement covers 
the period 2007–13 (see Figure 7). The multi-annual framework under 
the new Treaty will take the form of a Council regulation to which the 
European Parliament has to give its consent (Art. 312 TFEU). It will set 
concrete ceilings for the categories of expenditure mentioned.  
Figure 7. EU budget composition, Financial Perspectives for 2007–13 
 
Source: European Commission website, “Financial Programming and Budget”, 
“Financial Framework for the enlarged Union (2007-2013)” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/budget/prior_future/fin_framework_en.htm). 
  
                                                                                                                                 
Kauppi and W. Widgrén, Voting rules and budget allocation in an enlarged EU, 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5134, Centre for Economic and Policy Research, 
London, 2006. 70 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
Following the new budgetary procedure of the Treaty of Lisbon 
the European Parliament has a say on all categories of spending in the 
annual budget. The procedure resembles the ordinary (co-decision) 
procedure, with one reading followed by conciliation (Art. 314 TFEU).  
As for the EU as a whole, there are some ground rules for the 
budget. Subsidiarity also applies to the budget: the EU should only act 
and spend if it is better suited to do so, compared with lower levels of 
governance. Inextricably linked to subsidiarity is the proportionality 
principle, i.e. the content and form o f  E U  a c t i o n  s h o u l d  n o t  e x c e e d  
what is necessary to achieve the objective. Moreover, EU money 
should neither substitute for national funding, nor should EU funding 
reduce aggregate national public spending. This is described as 
additionality. 
Therefore, the EU budget is by no means comparable to national 
budgets, for which figures range between 40% and 50% of GDP. The 
2010 EU budget comprised €141.4 billion in commitment 
appropriations, which was less than the agreed ceiling of 1.24% of total 
EU GDP.92 
The biggest share of the 2010 budget was spent on “sustainable 
growth” (45.4%) and included both cohesion (34.9%) and 
competitiveness (14.9%). Cohesion is primarily addressed by the 
structural funds and the cohesion fund, which are the financial 
instruments of the EU’s regional policy to narrow the development 
disparities among regions and member states. The largest share of the 
funds allocated under the competitiveness heading are spent on EU 
research and development programmes. Through these programmes, 
the EU has become a large funder of fundamental and applied research 
(see Box 6). 
   
                                                      
92 Derived from the Financial Programming and Budget website of the 
European Commission, “Where does the money come from?” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/budget/budget_glance/where_from_en.htm).  For 
further information, see also on the same website, “The current year: 2010 – 
investing to restore jobs  and growth” 
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Box 6. EU R&D spending – A relatively new priority 
The idea of using EU funding (e.g. the EU budget or the European 
Investment Bank) to contribute significantly to research and development 
(R&D) in Europe is rather novel. Originally, research spending was 
concentrated on specific sectors originating from the Coal and Steel and 
Euratom Treaties. On energy, finance was limited to the objectives of 
Euratom. R&D as a public policy at the EU level for promoting growth was 
not a major issue prior to the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs in 2000. 
Additional momentum has gradually been building in the context of the 
global climate change negotiations, where technology has moved to the top 
of the agenda.  
For the Financial Perspectives period of 2007–13, the funding for the 
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) is €53.2 billion, representing a very 
significant increase from the previous period. 
The central funding mechanism at the EU level for research and 
innovation comes through the framework programmes. The first one 
originated in 1984 and currently we are at the seventh. Today’s FP7 is 
providing a particularly important turning point: the EU’s research strategy 
is based on advancing the European Research Area initiative, which focuses 
on increasing the number of scientists, the level of private and public 
research funding (aimed at reaching 3% of the EU’s GDP) and the quality of 
research in Europe, taking advantage of the economies of scale created by 
cross-border cooperation. In addition, the EU has set up the European 
Research Council (ERC), which concentrates on funding frontier research, 
and a number of agencies to better manage the programmes while leaving 
the European Commission and the ERC to concentrate on policy and 
research excellence rather than procedures. To this, one has to add the 
creation of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology and its 
‘Knowledge and Innovation Communities’, for highly integrated 
partnerships for bundling European excellence. 
Specifically on energy – as a key technology component of climate 
change – the EU has developed and approved a Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan, a technology roadmap with a very detailed description 
until 2020 of the financial requirements and the areas of research involved. 
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The next largest item is “preservation and management of 
natural resources” (agricultural expenditure and rural development), 
which accounts for 42% of the total budget (31% for agricultural 
expenditure), disbursed through several different instruments. Other 
areas are external relations (the “EU as a global player”), which 
accounts for 5.7%, and “citizenship, freedom, security and justice” 
(1.2%). The amount spent on administration is 5.6%. Two additional 
expenditures fall outside the official EU budget: the European 
development fund (EDF), with €22.7 billion in the period 2008–13; and 
military operations, which are decided upon through the ad-hoc 
‘Athena’ mechanism. Concerning the EDF, the Treaty of Lisbon has 
made it easier to envisage a future inclusion of the fund in the general 
budget (‘budgetisation’).  
The EU has its own resources to finance its expenditure. Legally, 
these resources belong to the Union. Member states collect them on 
behalf of the EU and transfer them to the EU budget. There are three 
kinds of own resources: 
•  The  resource based on gross national income (GNI) is a uniform 
percentage rate (0.73%) applied to the GNI of each member state 
(accounting for approximately 76% of total revenue). 
•  The  resource based on value added tax (VAT) is a uniform 
percentage rate that is applied to each member state’s 
harmonised VAT revenue (approximately 11% of total revenue). 
•  Traditional own resources mainly consist of duties charged on 
imports of products coming from a non-EU state (approximately 
12% of total revenue). 
The budget also receives other revenues, such as taxes paid by EU 
staff on their salaries, contributions from non-EU countries to certain 
EU programmes and fines on companies that breach competition or 
other laws (about 1% of total revenue). 
9.  The euro and its governance  
Since the launch of the euro notes in January 2002, the 12-nation 
eurozone has steadily expanded to 17 members with the recent entry of 
Estonia. The UK and Denmark have retained a legal opt-out while all 
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Europe) that joined the EU after 2004 are legally obliged to adopt the 
euro once they fulfil the entry criteria, but they can of course choose 
not to fulfil the criteria.93 Today the euro is the currency of some 330 
million Europeans. In addition, it is also used in some microstates and 
is widely circulated in Eastern Europe and a number of former colonies 
of EU member states. 
9.1  Governance 
A common currency had long been an aspiration of advocates of 
European integration. Back in 1969 the heads of state and government of 
the then European Community agreed on a plan for Economic and 
Monetary Union, the Werner Plan. But it was never implemented and 
soon abandoned. Most of the member states of the subsequent European 
Economic Community agreed in 1972, after the demise of the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates, to maintain stable exchange rates 
by preventing exchange rate fluctuations of more than 2.25% (termed 
the European ‘currency snake’) relative to each other. In 1979 the system 
was replaced by the European monetary system (EMS), which in theory 
was based on a new entity, the European Currency Unit (ECU) (a basket 
of currencies. In reality, however, the EMS was based on the 
Deutschemark and the German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) 
was at its centre. Because of the relative strength of the Deutschemark, 
and the low-inflation policies of the Bundesbank, all other currencies 
were de facto forced to follow its lead. The EMS was widely considered 
a ‘disinflationary device’, i.e. a mechanism that forced other member 
countries to converge gradually to German levels of inflation. It worked 
as long as other member countries had capital controls and thus could 
protect their exchange rates against large capital flows. Yet when capital 
markets were liberalised in the context of the internal market or EC 1992 
programme (see also chapter 2), member states had to choose between 
potentially unstable exchange rates driven by destabilising speculation 
or a jump ahead to monetary union. 
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As a result, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 established Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) as a formal objective, including the 
conditions that member states need to meet in order to join the euro. 
These conditions are known as ‘convergence criteria’.94 They are 
basically low and stable inflation, exchange rate stability and, critically, 
sound public finances, expressed as ceilings for budget deficits (3%) and 
debt per GDP (60%).  
Responsibility for monetary policy lies with an independent 
institution, the European System of Central Banks, which comprises the 
ECB in Frankfurt and the central banks of the EU states that have joined 
the eurozone. Fiscal policy – taxes and expenditures – remain the sole 
responsibility of member states even in the EMU. The autonomy of 
member states is nonetheless constrained by common rules on public 
finances detailed in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), whose purpose 
is to ensure adherence to the fiscal stability criteria. Member states 
retain full responsibility for their own structural policies (i.e. labour, 
pension and capital markets) although they agree, at least on paper, to 
coordinate to reach the ultimate goals of stability, growth and 
employment. In the 1990s this set-up was considered sufficient to ensure 
the stability of the eurozone. Large fiscal transfers among member states 
or between the EU and member states were ruled out by the Maastricht 
Treaty (the no-bailout clause, now Art. 125 TFEU).  
The SGP had already been agreed in 1996 to enforce observance of 
the fiscal convergence criteria. That notwithstanding, when Germany 
and France faced problems in observing the 3% deficit limit in 2003 they 
decided not to apply the strictures of the SGP and pushed instead for a 
Pact revision, which came into force in 2005. At the heart of the SGP is 
the excessive deficit procedure, which kicks in if member states fail to 
meet the Pact agreements, notably on public deficits and public debt. 
While the initial version of the SGP saw a quasi-automatic execution, the 
2005 version became more flexible to accommodate different 
circumstances, especially the business cycle. The two national 
thresholds – 60% for debt and 3% for the deficit – remained unchanged, 
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but in 2005 more flexibility and (to an extent) political discretion was 
introduced in the management of this excessive debt procedure.  
The eurozone is represented politically by its finance ministers, 
known collectively as the Eurogroup – the meeting of the euro-area 
finance ministers that is currently presided by Luxembourg’s Prime 
Minister Jean-Claude Juncker. This group usually meets a day before a 
meeting of the full Ecofin Council of all 27 member states. The 
Eurogroup is not an official Council formation but is mentioned in the 
Lisbon Treaty (Protocol No. 14) and when the full Ecofin Council votes 
on matters exclusively affecting the eurozone, only Eurogroup members 
are permitted to participate in the vote. 
The establishment of the EMU has not changed the fact that only 
member states are full members of international financial institutions 
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The President of the ECB 
and the Eurogroup attend global fora such as the G-7, G-8 and G-20, but 
decisions are taken solely by representatives of member states.  
9.2  Testing the euro: From the financial to the sovereign debt 
crisis 
The financial crisis broke out in 2007–08 when banking systems around 
the globe were threatening to melt down in the aftermath of the 
bankruptcy of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers. The leaders of 
the euro area countries met for an emergency session in Paris and put 
together a huge package of national support measures for the banking 
system in the form of loan guarantees and capital for particularly weak 
banks. This package, whose headline figure was around €2 trillion, did 
indeed stop the panic and markets stabilised after a few turbulent 
months.  
Still, euro governance was only put to a real test starting in spring 
2010 when rising government deficits and debt levels in some 
peripheral euro-member countries created alarm in financial markets 
about a possible sovereign debt crisis. The crisis started with Greece (a 
member of the euro area since 2001), when it became apparent that the 
country had misstated its public deficit for some time, leading to Greece 
being frozen out of the financial markets in early 2010.  
Yet Greece was not an isolated case. Debt from other countries, 
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Spain), was also downgraded and the euro dropped in the foreign 
exchange markets as financial markets judged euro governance as 
inadequate.  
There were no clear rules for how to deal with the financing 
difficulties of a euro area government as the situation was not supposed 
to arise. At the same time, financial markets within the eurozone have 
become so integrated that a sovereign default could lead to a 
generalised meltdown of financial markets, as occurred after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Indeed, this is what seemed to 
be starting in early May 2010 when there was not only a generalised sell 
of peripheral euro-area debt, but also signs of strains in many other, 
unrelated financial markets – not just in Europe. When faced with this 
danger of a widespread, financial market meltdown, the leaders of the 
eurozone met for a dramatic weekend summit in Brussels and put 
together a stabilisation package for the euro. The package consisted of a 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which could support euro 
area governments by raising up to €440 in funds.95 Another €60 billion 
was found in nooks and crannies of the EU budget, bringing the 
package to €500 billion. The European Council also pressed the IMF into 
the game, pencilling in another €250 billion to bring the headline figure 
for the entire package up to €750 billion.  
The creation of the EFSF at first seemed to calm the financial 
markets. At the end of October, however, turmoil erupted again when 
the extent of the losses in the Irish banking system became apparent and 
financial markets took fright at the suggestion of the German 
government that the private sector should somehow contribute to 
further rescues. The EFSF had clearly been seen as a temporary stopgap 
in Germany, which then insisted on a wider debate about the future of 
economic governance in the EU.  
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9.3  Institutional adaptation following the crisis 
The Greek crisis triggered reflection on how to strengthen and 
streamline economic governance of the eurozone to avoid a similar 
situation in the future. An initial result of this was the creation of a task 
force composed of finance ministers and headed by President of the 
European Council Herman Van Rompuy. In the autumn of 2010 this 
task force published a number of recommendations for strengthening 
the excessive deficit procedure of the Pact and also recommended the 
creation of a new ‘excessive imbalances procedure’ to allow the EU to 
address the problems instigated by countries running large deficits. At 
almost the same time the European Commission published very similar 
proposals (as part of its economic governance package),96 which 
additionally included the idea of introducing ‘reverse majority’ 
provisions in the Pact. Under such provisions, proposals by the 
European Commission to countries with excessive deficits are to be 
considered automatically adopted unless the Council of Ministers 
overrules them with a qualified majority. 
These proposals are likely to be adopted in 2011, as there is a 
consensus among all institutions – the European Commission, European 
Parliament, Council and the European Central Bank – on the need for 
broader and more effective surveillance of member states’ fiscal as well 
as macroeconomic policies and structural reforms. 
Another innovation that still needs to be fully implemented is a 
permanent crisis-resolution mechanism, i.e. a permanent EFSF. The 
European Council decided in October 2010 to start the process for a 
limited treaty amendment with the aim that any change could be 
ratified at the latest by mid-2013. It proposed to amend Art. 136 TFEU 
by introducing a new paragraph 3: “The Member States whose currency 
is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if 
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The 
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economic governance – A comprehensive Commission package of proposals”, 
29.9.2010 (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_ 
situation/2010-09-eu_economic_governance_proposals_en.htm). 78 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will 
be made subject to strict conditionality.” 
On 15 February 2011 the European Commission gave a positive 
opinion, stressing that the proposed amendment to the Treaty does not 
increase or dilute the competences of the Union. Following opinions of 
the European Parliament and the ECB, the heads of state and 
government formally agreed on the Treaty amendment at the European 
Council meeting of 24 March 2011. The so-called ‘simplified revision 
procedure’ (introduced by the Lisbon Treaty) will be sufficient for the 
limited change.  
Although the creation of the permanent crisis-resolution 
mechanism has attracted most attention, other reforms might turn out to 
be at least as important. One key issue here is the supervision of 
banking in the EU. Supervision of the financial service industry has 
remained in the hands of member states, although there is an EU-wide 
internal market for financial services, where financial service companies 
operate across borders. Until 2010 the coordination of regulation was 
undertaken by three separate committees on banking, insurance and 
securities, with few real powers. This has changed in 2011 with the 
creation of three agencies to oversee financial stability for banking (the 
European Banking Authority (EBA)), insurance and occupational 
pensions (the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA)) and securities markets (European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA)), leading to a new financial supervisory framework 
in Europe. The agencies are responsible for drafting harmonised 
technical standards and mediating in the event of disputes between 
national regulators. The new authorities have no direct supervisory 
powers, other than for credit-rating agencies operating in the EU. They 
can acquire EU-wide supervisory powers, however, should member 
states decide that an ‘emergency’ situation exists. Day-to-day oversight 
of individual companies and markets remains the task of national 
supervisory agencies. The seats of the new authorities are divided 
between London (EBA), Paris (ESMA) and Frankfurt (EIOPA). 
Another step forward comes with the establishment of the 
European Systemic Risk Board, whose task is to assess threats to 
financial stability in general. This new body, managed de facto by the 
ECB, might also play an important role in the evolving economic 
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10.  Lobbying and interest representation 
The fact that much economic regulation emanates from the EU level has 
made Brussels an important place where interest groups attempt to 
inform and influence the policy-making process. Since the 1980s the 
successive expansions of EU competences and increase in the powers of 
the European Parliament have led to a gradual growth of advocacy and 
lobby groups. No definitive figures exist but the literature typically 
assumes some 15,000 lobbyists are practising their trade in Brussels.97 
They include private and public sector interests as diverse as businesses, 
their trade and professional associations and industry groupings, 
chambers of commerce, trade unions, regions, regional and local 
governments, churches and their organisations, non-government 
organisations (NGOs), non-profit organisations and think tanks. Also 
represented are international organisations, such as UN organisations or 
the World Bank, and finally public relations consultancies and law 
firms. In addition, the permanent representations of the EU member 
states and well over 100 diplomatic missions are attempting to defend 
their interests. We can assume that the vast majority of these groupings 
concentrate on collecting, processing and dispatching information and 
intelligence to keep their headquarters up to date with EU 
developments.  
More and more interest groups, NGOs and think tanks seek to 
influence decisions from a European rather than just a national 
perspective. At times, actors turn to the EU level if they are not 
supported by decision-makers at the national level. Recent prominent 
examples have been take-over or merger cases, or when German private 
banks accused their government of protecting its public sector banks 
(Landesbanken). Thereby the EU has slipped into a multi-layer 
governance system.  
10.1  Conditions and specificities at the EU level 
In principle lobbying in the EU or, as it is increasingly called, advocacy 
or public affairs, is no different than in any national context. Even so, 
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there are a number of features related to the EU and the working of its 
institutions that add a twist to EU lobbying. Instead of a government 
there is a complex governance structure of interacting institutions at the 
EU level. In the European Parliament for instance, European-wide 
parties exist, but compared with the national level they rather resemble 
associations of national parties from similar political families. Equally 
there are hardly any European-wide mass media. An organised civil 
society is only emerging.  
Like national institutions, the EU institutions rely on 
stakeholders and national experts to provide relevant information. The 
European Commission has put in place a system of consultative 
committees on a wide range of issues. The current number of these 
committees is expected to be somewhere around 1,000.98 
Key factors for the potential influence of a stakeholder are 
technical expertise (i.e. information) and scope (i.e. legitimacy through 
representation of a broad range of (pan-European) members). In 
addition to the provision of information, stakeholders also provide 
legitimacy for the European institutions. For instance, arguments 
coming from stakeholders can strengthen the European Commission’s 
position in the decision-making process, with respect to both national 
governments in the Council and party-political views in the European 
Parliament. Stakeholder support is thus important for the European 
Commission to ensure that its policy proposals are making it through 
the EU’s complex decision-making process. Examples of this kind of 
cooperation include those of the European Commission working with 
business groups such as the European Round Table of Industrialists to 
advance the internal market or the European IT Round Table to realise 
high-tech research programmes like ESPRIT. In some cases the 
European Commission has undertaken measures to support the 
participation of interest groups to achieve a more balanced interest 
representation at the EU level, for example through the organisation of 
networking events or stakeholder consultations. 
                                                      
98 Based on 2004 figures given by the European Commission following an 
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The consecutive treaty changes, resulting in the extension of the 
ordinary legislative procedure, have led to a considerable increase in 
lobbying activities vis-à-vis the European Parliament during the 
legislative phase. Interest representatives often focus their activities on 
the rapporteur. In parallel, lobbies also use their member state base to 
influence the positions of their national governments in the Council.  
10.2  Towards a framework for interest representation at the EU 
In response to past accusations that EU institutions tend to work with 
‘preferred interlocutors’, the EU institutions are progressively trying to 
establish a framework for interest representation. This issue was 
addressed in the context of the European Commission’s White Paper on 
European Governance from 200199 and its follow-up initiatives. A first 
step has been to rationalise consultation. In 2002, the European 
Commission unilaterally adopted basic norms for consultation, 
including inter alia, respect for a minimum period of eight weeks from 
consultation to decision and the obligation to provide feedback on the 
outcomes of the consultation. The European Commission is also tasked 
with consulting with the widest possible variety of stakeholders to 
ensure a plurality of views, including online consultations. The objective 
is to create more transparency and more plurality in consultation. In 
addition, the European Commission is obliged to undertake and publish 
for any significant legislation an integrated impact assessment to ex ante 
evaluate and quantify – as far as possible – the economic, social or 
environmental consequences of the proposed legislation. Quite 
predictably, this has led to a large number of academic studies being 
conducted in parallel with the European Commission’s processes.  
With its 2007 follow-up on the European Transparency 
Initiative,100 the European Commission decided to gradually establish a 
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framework for the institutions’ relations with interest groups. Since 
2008, the European Commission has put in place a voluntary register 
and elaborated a code of conduct for interest groups. The main elements 
are the disclosure of their identity and their clients’ identities (i.e. their 
interests or those of their clients), objective information on the 
organisations and a declaration that they will not obtain information in 
any illegal way. In return, the European Commission has committed to 
provide information on important meetings and to consult with the 
registered interest groups. Violation of the code of conduct will result in 
exclusion from the registry. By mid-summer 2010, around 3,000 
organisations were registered, of which more than half were private 
interest organisations, followed by NGOs and research groups (30%), 
consultants and law firms. Meanwhile, the European Parliament – 
which has had its own registry in place since 1999 – has pleaded for a 
joint European Commission/Parliament registry and a joint working 
group is currently exploring ways to establish such a registry by mid-
2011.  
In conclusion, while the EU framework for interest representation 
is far younger, less developed and entails fewer constraints than for 
example that of the US, it constitutes a step forward in the governance 
of lobbying and transparency compared with almost all member states. 
In particular the registers for expert groups and for interest 
representatives provide a fair degree of transparency. And what is valid 
for the EU as a whole is also true for interest representation: it will 
continue to evolve. 
11.  The EU’s external action 
In the past, it has often been said that the EU is a giant when it comes to 
international trade, but a dwarf in international politics. It has been a 
long-term challenge of the EU to speak with one voice on international 
topics, as foreign policy remains one of the emblems of a sovereign 
nation state. Yet one of the purposes of a Union foreign policy is not to 
replace states, but to increase the impact that a national foreign policy 
can have individually, for example in development policy where the EU 
and member states contribute more than half of the development 
assistance provided by developed nations. Over the years, the Union 
has built a complex system of competences and decision-making in 84 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
foreign affairs. On the one hand, these include exclusive EU 
competences, like those for trade, where the EU is represented alongside 
the 27 member states in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). On the 
other hand, there are shared competences in many areas, such as in 
neighbourhood policy, development policy, international humanitarian 
cooperation and in most external dimensions of the internal policies of 
the Union (e.g. climate, energy, migration, transport, public health and 
fisheries). In these fields the EU is represented by a combination of the 
European Commission and member states. The question of the EU’s 
external representation likewise extends to foreign security and defence 
matters and how the EU is represented in international organisations.  
11.1  Common foreign and security policy and the High 
Representative 
Various forms of political cooperation have existed in the EU for many 
years. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established the EU’s CFSP as a 
policy outside the classical Community system with limited powers for 
the European Commission. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 created the 
position of the High Representative for CFSP (initially held by Javier 
Solana) mainly to represent the EU externally. 
With the Lisbon Treaty, foreign and security policy decisions of 
the EU are taken by consensus by the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) or 
the European Council. Decisions on objectives and strategic 
pronouncements are typically undertaken by the European Council 
while the necessary follow-up decisions are guided by the FAC to 
ensure – together with the High Representative – the “unity, consistency 
and effectiveness of action by the EU” (Art. 26(2) TEU). Reflecting the 
organising principle, which is forging “mutual political solidarity” (Art. 
24(2) and (3) TEU) among member states, EU foreign and security policy 
essentially aims at protecting the identified common interests and 
defending common values. A consequence of this focus is that EU 
foreign policy-making is largely kept out of the judicial supervision of 
the European Court of Justice and the political control of the European 
Parliament, with two exceptions. The European Parliament has 
budgetary oversight and fully co-decides on the human resources (staff 
regulations). THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 85 
 
In practice, EU foreign and defence policy is based on the 
following three instruments: 
•  definition of general guidelines;  
•  decisions on EU joint actions, propositions and detailed 
arrangements for implementation; and  
•  ways to strengthen cooperation systematically among member 
states. 
A crucial innovation is the significant ‘beefing-up’ of the position 
of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
policy. The High Representative is the main coordinator and the 
representative to the outside world. A particular innovation of the 
Lisbon Treaty is that the High Representative is institutionally anchored 
in both the Council of Ministers and the European Commission – in the 
Council as High Representative and in the European Commission as 
one of its vice presidents, with the portfolio for external relations. The 
High Representative now also chairs the FAC. 
The powers of the High Representative include the right of 
initiative in foreign policy, alongside (any of) the member states. The 
High Representative can also put forward a proposal jointly with the 
European Commission. She chairs the FAC meetings with the exception 
of the trade discussions, which are chaired by the rotating Council 
presidency. She also conducts the CFSP and is responsible for the 
implementation of foreign policy decisions in addition to being 
responsible for coordination with EU member states in international 
organisations and at international conferences. The High Representative 
can address the UN Security Council (UNSC) whenever the Union has a 
defined position on the issue being discussed and depending on 
acceptance of the High Representative doing so by the non-EU UNSC 
members. Added to these responsibilities are those as chairperson of the 
boards of foreign and security policy-relevant agencies that have been 
set up to deal with EU-wide capacity building, the development of a 
common security culture, satellite imagery and education.101 
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In all those activities, the High Representative is assisted by the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), which is an EU body of a 
special nature, having been the result of complex negotiations among 
the member states, the European Parliament, the European Commission 
and the High Representative. The service includes civil servants coming 
from the European Commission, diplomats from the national foreign 
ministries and officials of the General Secretariat of the Council. At the 
time of writing the EEAS was in the process of being established. It was 
officially launched on 1 December 2010 and the process should be fully 
completed by 2013. Although the head of the EEAS (‘appointing 
authority’) is the High Representative, day-to-day business is managed 
by its Secretary-General, two deputies and a director-general for budget 
and administration. At the start of its life, the EEAS has fewer than 4,000 
staff, compared with about 95,000 diplomats working for the national 
foreign ministries of the EU-27 member states and over 20,000 for the 
US State Department (France and Germany have more than 10,000 
national diplomats each). 
In principle, all decisions on the CFSP are taken by unanimity. Yet 
sometimes it is possible for a country not to join the others in an action 
without blocking it. Such an approach is called ‘constructive abstention’, 
whereby a country that abstains from a CFSP decision is not bound by it, 
but pledges not to take any unilateral action that might conflict with it. 
There is also a theoretical possibility of closer cooperation in foreign 
policy among fewer than 27 member states (enhanced cooperation), but 
the decision allowing for enhanced cooperation in this policy area needs 
to be taken by unanimity. 
11.2  EU defence cooperation 
Contrary to foreign and security policy, defence cooperation among the 
EU member states is still at an early stage, notwithstanding that defence 
cooperation began in 1948 with the creation of the Western European 
Union, the EU’s initial defence arm, whose substantive provisions have 
been submerged into the EU Treaties (see also appendix 1). The current 
common security and defence policy allows for establishing permanent 
structured cooperation in defence matters for member states that wish 
to do so. 
The major obstacle for the European countries in advancing this 
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developing collective military capabilities. One should keep in mind 
that the EU comprises four neutral member states (i.e. Austria, Finland, 
Ireland and Sweden) and a number of additional ones with a very 
limited military capacity. Nevertheless, the option of embarking on 
permanent cooperation in defence matters has been created, not least as 
a tool for introducing flexibility for future integration efforts. The Treaty 
stipulates that only those member states with military capabilities 
fulfilling “higher criteria” and having “made more binding 
commitments to one another” can participate in this defence partnership 
(Art. 42(6) TEU). Typically for the EU, such selective yet permanent 
cooperation is to remain open to the initially non-participating states.  
The drafting of the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’102 in 1992 was the 
first step in that direction. They entailed the establishment of EU 
battlegroups, which became fully operational in 2007. To date, the EU 
claims to be able to undertake simultaneously two single, rapid 
response operations of battlegroup size (about 1,500 soldiers each). 
11.3  The EU in international diplomacy and organisations 
The Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 has not only reformed decision-making 
and provided for (some) institutional innovations, it has also addressed 
representation of the EU in foreign policy, international diplomacy and 
international organisations. The main innovations are outlined below:  
•  representation of the EU in international relations is provided by 
the European Commission on all issues except CFSP; 
•  representation of the EU in international relations in all CFSP 
matters is provided by the High Representative, who also oversees 
coordination among policies; 
 
 
                                                      
102 The Petersberg tasks cover humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping 
tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, 
and as an integral part of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) are 
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•  representation at the highest level of heads of state and 
government is provided by the President of the European 
Commission (on all issues except CFSP) and the President of the 
European Council (on CFSP matters); and 
•  the EEAS has been set up, with 137 delegations worldwide. 
In reality, however, this division of labour can be complex. 
Moreover, concerning the external representation of the Union, at the 
time of writing there was still disagreement regarding international 
negotiations on issues that fall under the shared competence of the 
Union and member states (so-called ‘mixed agreements’).  
The EU’s role in external policies and its representation also 
depend on non-EU states accepting a uniform EU representation in 
international fora of which they are part. At one end of the spectrum are 
international organisations in which the EU has no institutional status, 
including the UNSC, NATO and the World Bank. Such cases are 
becoming fewer and fewer, however, and even where they continue to 
exist, the EU as an actor is gradually being felt.103 
At the other end of the spectrum are those situations in which 
the EU has exclusive competences and therefore a preeminent position 
in the relevant organisations and legal conventions. The major case in 
point is in the trade policy field, concerning the WTO and the World 
Customs Organisation. For the WTO in particular the European 
Commission is the sole negotiator operating under negotiation 
directives from the member states. In addition to negotiating 
multilateral trade agreements, this also means that the European 
Commission negotiates all international bilateral (i.e. EU and third-
                                                      
103 In the UNSC, the EU is beginning to have some limited access to speak. The 
EU–NATO relationship is now sometimes described as one of strategic 
partnership. One could think of fostering this partnership by reciprocal 
observer status (at the North Atlantic Council and the EU Political and Security 
Committee). The arrangements at the World Bank represent a major anomaly, 
since the EU is now a larger aid donor than any of its member states, and its 
operational partnerships in the European and African regions are important, 
yet it does not even have observer status on the executive board (only on its 
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party) agreements. With the Treaty of Lisbon the scope of the EU’s trade 
policy has been extended and now covers trade in goods and services 
and the commercial aspects of intellectual property as well as foreign 
direct investment. 
The most complex situations arise for the large category of 
policies that entail shared competences with the EU, where both the EU 
and member states are present, but where the EU presence spans a 
broad range from a simple observer alongside many others (e.g. 67 at 
the UN General Assembly),104 through ‘enhanced observer’ or ‘virtual 
member’ to full member or contracting party alongside the member 
states as in a number of important UN conventions and protocols, such 
as those on ozone depletion, climate change and pesticides, to name but 
a few. In most cases, both the EU represented by the European 
Commission and the member states are parties to conventions and 
protocols. EU representation then depends on legal details in the Treaty 
and decisions by the EU on how to most efficiently and effectively be 
represented in the negotiation process. 
11.4  Other EU-specific external relations 
The framework for development cooperation policy has been largely 
maintained with the Treaty of Lisbon. If before the EU’s policy 
corresponded with national policies, now the EU’s policy and the 
national ones on development cooperation should “complement and 
reinforce each other” (Art. 208(1) TFEU). The Union policy is jointly 
managed by the European Commission (at the operational level) and 
the European External Action Service (at the strategic level).  
The ‘neighbourhood policy’ portfolio is jointly managed by the 
High Representative and the respective Commissioner.105 
                                                      
104 See M. Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Egmont – The Royal Institute for International 
Relations, European Policy Centre and the University of Leuven, Brussels and 
Leuven, 2011. 
105 The neighbourhood policy covers Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia in Eastern Europe and countries in the southern 
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Neighbourhood policy focuses on states to which the Union offers 
cooperation much closer than with other partners. With most of such 
states there are negotiations on a free trade agreement. Several other 
forms of cooperation take place in specific areas, for instance migration, 
energy or maritime affairs. 
In contrast, EU enlargement policy continues to be managed by 
the European Commission, but there are geographical desks within the 
EEAS that also deal with the respective countries on other matters.106 
Enlargement policy aims at preparing the countries concerned to 
become full EU members when they, as well as the EU, are ready. The 
conditions for accession are comprehensive and include complete 
adoption of the EU legal system as well as meeting conditions on 
democratic governance, the rule of law and respect of human rights. 
12.  Conclusion: Understanding the ‘ever-changing Union’ 
More than a year after its entry into force it is certainly still too early for 
a full assessment of the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the Union’s 
institutional development. As with any legal text, this Treaty is only a 
framework that sets the scene for political action to bring it to life and to 
use its full potential.  
Inevitably this short book can only provide a temporary 
snapshot of an organisation that is subject to constant evolution and 
change. The Treaty of Lisbon, as the – at least temporary – endpoint of a 
long process of comprehensive treaty revisions, is set to allow for some 
consolidation of the Union’s basic framework. Future treaty changes are 
likely to be much more limited in scope and targeted at specific issues 
(such as the European Stability Mechanism). National leaders will 
probably also be very hesitant to confer additional competences to the 
EU in order to avoid referenda. 
Irrespective of further treaty amendments, however, there is still 
large potential for institutional adaptation and change. This partly stems 
from open questions concerning the concrete implementation and 
                                                      
106 Enlargement policy covers Iceland, the countries of the Western Balkans and 
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institutional practices under the Lisbon Treaty, developments at the 
sub-treaty level (secondary law, jurisprudence and inter-institutional 
agreements) and possible initiatives outside the Treaty framework that 
have a direct impact on it and prospects for future integration (e.g. as 
happened in the past with the Schengen Agreement).  
Owing to the complex structures of the EU, which have never 
been designed according to a master plan, many Europeans (and non-
Europeans) still lack even a basic understanding of how the EU 
functions. With this guide the authors hope that they have increased 
general knowledge among readers and stimulated their interest in 
knowing more about how the EU works. 
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Glossary of key terms and abbreviations 
APS  Annual Policy Strategy, previously the strategic 
programme for the year ahead, which has since been 
replaced by the ‘state of the union’ address by the 
President of the European Commission before the 
plenary of the European Parliament. 
Bretton  Woods  System  System of fixed currency exchange rates launched 
after World War II. 
CEECs  Central and Eastern European countries previously 
under Soviet Union dominance (later joining the EU 
in 2004). 
CFSP  Common foreign and security policy (of the EU) 
Co-decision  The EU’s principal legislative procedure through 
which both the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament co-decide on the basis of a 
Commission proposal (referred to as the Æ‘ordinary 
legislative procedure’ since the ÆTreaty of Lisbon). 
Comitology  This term traditionally referred to the monitoring of 
the European Commission’s executive powers by 
way of committees chaired by the European 
Commission and composed of representatives from 
each member state. With the Treaty of Lisbon, this 
system has been overhauled and a division between 
quasi-legislative acts (‘delegated acts’) and mere 
implementing acts has been introduced. A revised 
comitology system applies solely to the latter. 
Community  method  An expression used for the institutional operating 
mode marked by a supranational stance (rather than 
an intergovernmental one) with due respect for the 
Æsubsidiarity principle. It has the following salient 
features: 
•  the European Commission’s monopoly of the 
right of initiative;  
•  widespread use of qualified majority voting in 
the Council;  
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•  the European Parliament and Council of 
Ministers having the same powers concerning 
the amendment of legislative proposals from 
the European Commission; and  
•  a uniform interpretation of Community law by 
the European Court of Justice. 
Consent  procedure  The consent procedure is one of the ‘special 
legislative procedures’ of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Under this procedure, adoption of a legislative act 
only requires the consent of the European 
Parliament, which cannot suggest concrete 
amendments, as is the case under the Æordinary 
legislative procedure. 
Constitutional Treaty  This Treaty was prepared by the Convention on the 
Future of Europe and the subsequent 
ÆIntergovernmental Conference; it ultimately failed 
to secure ratification in France and the Netherlands, 
but many elements were later taken up in the 
ÆTreaty of Lisbon. 
Consultation procedure  The  consultation procedure is one of the ‘special 
legislative procedures’ of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Under this procedure, adoption of a legislative act 
only requires consultation of the European 
Parliament. 
CoR  The Committee of the Regions is an advisory body 
composed of representatives of regional and local 
authorities in EU member states; it was established 
by the Treaty of Maastricht. 
COREPER  French acronym for the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives, composed of EU member states’ 
ambassadors or deputy ambassadors (respectively 
COREPER II or I) who deal with draft laws before 
they are passed to ministers in the ÆCouncil of 
Ministers.  
COSI  Standing Committee on Internal Security, 
introduced by the ÆTreaty of Lisbon to promote 
and strengthen cooperation on internal security 
within the EU (Art. 71 TFEU). 
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Council of Ministers  The  Council  of  Ministers (also referred to as the 
‘Council’) groups member states at ministerial level 
to normally co-decide with the European Parliament 
on EU law. The Council currently meets in 10 
different formations, depending on the policy issue; 
there are some 100 Council meetings annually. 
Court of Auditors  EU institution to audit EU financial management. 
DG  Directorate-General, normally a department within 
the European Commission. DG is also the term used 
in other EU institutions. 
EBA European  Banking  Authority 
EC  European Community, a founding element of the 
European integration process. It was established as 
the ÆEEC (European Economic Community) by the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957, with the principal objective 
of creating a common market without internal 
borders. The establishment of the European Union 
in 1992 did not cause the European Economic 
Community to disappear. It remained part of the EU 
under the designation ‘European Community’; 
sometimes EC is also (confusingly) used as an 
abbreviation for the ÆEuropean Commission. 
EC  1992  Programme to complete the ÆEC internal market 
following the ÆSingle European Act (SEA). 
ECB  European Central Bank, created by the ÆTreaty of 
Maastricht and independent of the EU member 
states; headquarters in Frankfurt. 
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights; with the 
Treaty of Lisbon the EU is obliged to accede to the 
ECHR (accession negotiations are underway at the 
time of writing); all EU member states are parties to 
the Convention. 
Ecofin  A Council of Ministers formation dealing with 
economic and financial affairs; Ecofin is one of the 
most important Council configurations. 
ECSC  European Coal and Steel Community, created by the 
first of the ‘European’ Treaties in 1952. 
EDF  European Development Fund 
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EEA  European Economic Area, formed through a 
cooperation agreement between the EU and 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, and enabling 
the latter countries to take part in the EU’s internal 
market and some other policies. 
EEC  European Economic Community, established by the 
ÆTreaty of Rome in 1957, with the principal 
objective of creating a common market without 
internal borders (ÆEC). 
EESC  European Economic and Social Committee; a 
consultative body of the EU composed of 
employers’ organisations, trade unions and 
representatives of various other interests. It is 
similar to the ÆCommittee of the Regions (CoR). 
EFSF  European Financial Stability Facility; established as 
a Luxembourg-registered company by the member 
states of the euro area in 2010 for a limited period 
(three years). From 2013 onwards it shall be replaced 
by a permanent stability mechanism (ÆESM), which 
requires a treaty change (i.e. ratification by all EU 
m e m b e r  s t a t e s ) ,  h o w e v e r .  A s  p a r t  o f  a n  o v e r a l l  
rescue package of €750 billion, the EFSF is able to 
issue bonds guaranteed by the euro countries for up 
to €440 billion for on-lending to euro countries in 
difficulty, subject to conditions negotiated with the 
European Commission in liaison with the European 
Central Bank and International Monetary Fund and 
to be approved by the Eurogroup. 
EFSM  European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism; also a 
part of the overall rescue package (like the ÆEFSF) 
with €60 billion guaranteed by the EU budget. The 
mechanism is managed by the European 
Commission and based on Art. 122(2) TFEU and on 
an intergovernmental agreement among euro 
countries. 
EIOPA  European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority. 
EMS  European monetary system, precursor to the 
ÆEMU. 
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EMU  Economic and Monetary Union 
Enhanced  cooperation  Allows those countries of the Union that wish to 
continue to work more closely together to do so, 
while respecting the single institutional framework 
of the Union as laid out in the Treaties.  
EPSO  European Personnel Selection Office, which 
manages the recruitment of EU officials and 
contractual agents. 
ERC  European Research Council; European funding 
body to support ‘frontier research’. 
ESM  European Stability Mechanism; permanent 
mechanism to succeed the temporary ÆEFSF after 
2013; it will require amendment of the ÆTFEU (i.e. 
ratification by all member states). 
ESMA  European Securities and Markets Authority 
Euratom  Atomic Energy Community, founded in 1957, as 
part of the ÆTreaties of Rome.  
Eurogroup  Meeting of the finance ministers of eurozone 
countries. 
Eurojust  Eurojust is the EU’s judicial cooperation body 
created to improve the fight against serious crime by 
facilitating coordination of action for investigations 
and prosecutions covering the territory of more than 
one member state. Eurojust is composed of 27 
members from each member state (senior judges, 
prosecutors or police officers). 
Europe  à  la  carte  An unofficial term referring to a non-uniform 
concept of integration that would allow member 
states to selectively participate in policies.  
European Citizens’ Initiative  A million EU citizens will be able to ask (but not 
force) the European Commission to present new 
policy initiatives that fall within its area of 
competence. 
European Commission  This EU institution is responsible for implementing 
and managing EU policies (except ÆCFSP), 
legislative proposals and respect of EU law (in its 
role as ‘guardian of the Treaties’). 
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European Council  The meeting of the heads of state and government in 
the EU to provide strategic direction; since the 
ÆTreaty of Lisbon, it has become an EU institution 
with a full-time elected President. 
European Court of Justice  EU supreme judiciary in most policy areas except 
(ECJ) foreign  (ÆCFSP), security and defence policies. 
European Defence  This attempt in the early 1950s to integrate the 
Community  armies of the original six members was later 
aborted. 
European External  EU ‘diplomatic corps’ set up by the ÆTreaty of 
Action Service (EEAS)  Lisbon. 
European Parliament (EP)  The European Parliament consists of directly elected 
ÆMEPs.  
Europol    European Police Office, the European law 
enforcement agency dealing with cross-border 
matters. 
European Political Union   This attempt (in 1952–53) to create an integrated  
   (EPU)  European foreign policy was later aborted. 
Eurosclerosis  An unofficial term describing a period in the 1970s 
and early 1980s marked by a perceived stagnation of 
European integration, partly owing to high 
unemployment and slow job creation in spite of 
overall economic growth. 
FAC  Foreign Affairs Council, a meeting of EU foreign 
affairs ministers that is part of the ÆCouncil of 
Ministers.  
G-7    Periodic meeting of the world’s leading 
industrialised countries to cooperate on 
international economic and monetary issues. It was 
formed in 1976, when Canada joined the Group of 
Six: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and US. 
G-8  By adding Russia, the G-7 became the G-8. The EU is 
represented within the G-8, but cannot host or chair 
it.  
G-20  The G-20 consists of the members of the G-7 plus 12 
other nations (including China, India, Brazil, Saudi 
Arabia and Russia) and the EU (which cannot host 
or chair it). The G-20 was formed in 1999 as a forum 
for member nations to discuss key issues related to 
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GAC  General Affairs Council, the meeting of EU foreign 
ministers or state secretaries for EU affairs of the 
member states; it forms part of the ÆCouncil of 
Ministers and meets monthly. 
High Authority  This  supranational  administrative executive of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ÆECSC) first 
took office in 1952 in Luxembourg, and later became 
the ÆEuropean Commission. 
High  Representative  High Representative for the common foreign and 
security policy (ÆCFSP), created under the ÆTreaty 
of Amsterdam to coordinate and externally 
represent the EU’s CFSP. 
IGC  An Intergovernmental Conference gathers together 
representatives of member states’ governments with 
a view to amending the EU Treaties. 
JHA  Justice and home affairs in the EU context involves 
cooperation on matters of internal security, 
immigration and judicial matters (ÆPJCC,  Æpillar 
structure). 
MEP  Member of the ÆEuropean Parliament 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the principal 
Western and therefore European security and 
defence framework founded after World War II. 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development  
Ordinary legislative  Name of the EU’s principal legislative procedure  
procedure following  the  ÆTreaty of Lisbon, whereby both the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament 
decide on a final text through Æco-decision. 
Pillar structure  Between 1993 and 2009, the EU legally consisted of 
three pillars, which was abandoned with the entry 
into force of the ÆTreaty of Lisbon, when the EU 
acquired a single legal personality. The three pillars 
consisted of  
1)  a European Community pillar, which covered 
economic, social and environmental policies; 
2)  the common foreign and security policy 
(ÆCFSP), which covered foreign policy and 
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3)  police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters (ÆPJCC), which brought together 
cooperation in the fight against crime. This 
pillar originally incorporated all matters 
pertaining to Æjustice and home affairs (JHA), 
but the ÆTreaty of Amsterdam moved large 
parts of JHA policies to the Community pillar. 
PJCC  Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
which under the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties 
made up the third EU Æpillar (under the earlier 
Maastricht Treaty, this pillar had been referred to as 
cooperation on Æjustice and home affairs (JHA)). 
PSC  The Political and Security Committee (also referred 
t o  b y  i t s  F r e n c h  a c r o n y m ,  C O P S )  i s  a  p e r m a n e n t  
body in the field of common foreign and security 
policy mentioned in Art. 25 of the Treaty on 
European Union (ÆTEU). 
QMV  Qualified majority voting, whereby a qualified 
majority of the number of votes is required in the 
Council of Ministers for a decision to be adopted 
when issues are not decided under the unanimity 
rule. 
Schengen  The Schengen Agreement was signed on 14 June 
1985 by some member states to remove controls at 
their common borders and introduce freedom of 
movement for all nationals of the signatory member 
states, other member states or non-EU countries. 
  Originally outside the framework of the EU Treaties, 
since 1999 it has formed part of the institutional and 
legal framework of the EU by virtue of a protocol to 
the ÆTreaty of Amsterdam. 
  The Schengen Agreement has been extended over 
time to all member states except Ireland and the UK, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus. Non-EU countries 
Iceland, Norway and Switzerland are also members. 
Schuman  Plan  The Schuman Plan, which led to the Schuman 
Declaration on 9 May 1950, was a proposal by then 
French foreign minister Robert Schuman to create a 
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for a supranational Community; seen as the origin of 
the EU (ÆECSC, EEC, Euratom, EC). 
SEA  Single European Act; reform of the EU Treaties as a 
reaction to the period of ÆEurosclerosis. The SEA 
entered into force in 1987 and led to the creation of 
the internal market (ÆEC 1992). 
Second pillar  Common foreign and security policy (ÆCFSP) pillar 
covering foreign policy and military matters prior to 
the ÆTreaty of Lisbon (see also Æpillar structure). 
Stability and Growth  The SGP aims at ensuring that member states  
   Pact (SGP)  maintain  budgetary  discipline  after  adopting  the 
single currency. 
Subsidiarity principle  The principle of subsidiarity stipulates that the EU 
should only act in those areas where the same result 
cannot be achieved just as well at the national 
(regional or local) levels. 
TEC   Treaty  establishing the European Community; 
renamed ÆTFEU by the ÆTreaty of Lisbon. 
TEU  Treaty on European Union (also referred to as the 
ÆTreaty of Maastricht); the TEU introduced the 
EU’s  Æpillar structure, which was later formally 
abandoned by the ÆTreaty of Lisbon. 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; 
formerly the Treaty on European Community 
(ÆTEC), which was subsequently amended and 
renamed TFEU by the ÆTreaty of Lisbon. 
Third  pillar  The pillar on police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters (ÆPJCC) brought together 
cooperation in the fight against crime prior to the 
ÆTreaty of Lisbon (see also Æpillar structure). This 
pillar was originally much broader and 
encompassed all matters pertaining to Æjustice and 
home affairs (JHA). 
Treaty  of  Amsterdam  Reform treaty that entered into force in 1999; it 
amended the ÆTEU and ÆTEC. 
Treaty  of  Lisbon  Reform treaty that entered into force in 2009; it 
amended the ÆTEU and ÆTEC (renaming the latter 
the ÆTFEU). 
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Treaty  of  Maastricht  Reform treaty that entered into force in 1993; it 
amended the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (TEEC), renaming the latter 
the ÆTEC. The Treaty of Maastricht is also referred 
to as theÆTEU. 
Treaty  of  Nice  Reform treaty that entered into force in 2003; it 
amended the ÆTEU and ÆTEC. 
Treaty(ies)  of  Rome  Two treaties that entered into force on 1 January 
1958 at the origin of European integration, namely 
the ÆEEC and ÆEuratom Treaties.  
 
For further information, see the website of the European Commission, “Europa 
Glossary” (http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/index_en.htm). 102 |  
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Appendix 1. Post-War European Organisations 
In addition to the EU, a great number of organisations have been created to 
deal with the architecture of Europe after the Second World War, the most 
important of which are described below. 
Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe (started in 1949) is a forum for political 
discussion in which 47 European countries, including all EU 
countries, Turkey and Russia, meet to discuss political issues. Its 
main political significance pertains to cultural and human rights 
issues, notably through its court, the European Court of Human 
Rights based in Strasbourg. According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU 
is foreseen to accede to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Accession 
negotiations began on 7 July 2010. 
Defence and security organisations  
Western European Union. The WEU was founded in 1948 (Brussels 
Treaty) as a defence pool among Western European countries. It 
included the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and the UK; 
Germany and Italy joined later. With the decision to create an 
integrated military structure within NATO in 1951, the WEU lost its 
appeal. In the early 1990s there were attempts to revive the 
organisation and to use it as a security and defence profile for the EU. 
The Amsterdam Treaty integrated the WEU into the EU.On 31 March 
2010, the contracting parties decided to terminate the Treaty because 
the “WEU has…accomplished its historical role”107 and close down 
the organisation in 2011. 
                                                      
107 According to the contracting parties, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK, the WEU has made its 
“contribution to peace and stability in Europe and to the development of the 
European security and defence architecture, promoting consultations and 
cooperation in this field, and conducting operations in a number of theatres, 
including [the] Petersberg tasks”. THE EVER-CHANGING UNION | 105 
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Founded in 1949, NATO 
was and still is the main basis for collective Western defence and 
security. The decision to create an integrated military structure 
fostered NATO’s role as the anchor for Western European security. 
From the mid-1980s, various attempts have been made to strengthen 
the European pillar of the North Atlantic alliance. With the end of the 
cold war, NATO has also been redefining its role in a changed 
political and economic environment. On several occasions NATO has 
admitted new members from Eastern Europe. To avoid being seen as 
a threat by Russia, NATO has developed a partnership with Russia. 
Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952. 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). OSCE is a 
body through which East and West meet to discuss security, human 
rights and cooperation issues. At one time it was expected to develop 
into a crucial organisation in the pan-European security architecture. 
The end of the cold war ended this ambition, however. Today the 
OSCE has nevertheless become a body through which Europe, Russia 
and Central Asia discuss emerging security questions. 
Economic organisations 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The 
emergency organisations of the United Nations and European 
governments were combined in the UNECE in 1946. During the cold 
war it had some success in bringing about pan-European cooperation 
in research, highway mapping, statistics and the removal of some 
obstacles to East–West trade. Although traditionally a bridge between 
East and West, the UNECE’s significance has diminished rather than 
increased. Its current importance for East–West relations is eclipsed 
by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The 
OECD was originally set up to restore free trade and foster closer 
European economic cooperation. Its first success was the creation of 
the European Payments Union (set up in 1950). It also successfully 
pursued a programme to remove trade quotas. Currently the OECD 
has a membership that includes all industrialised countries (the EU 
countries, the US, Japan, Canada, etc.) and concentrates on broader 106 | EGENHOFER, KURPAS, KACZYŃSKI & VAN SCHAIK 
 
international issues of economic cooperation and development. The 
OECD’s main role is to provide authoritative economic analysis, 
statistics and policy advice in a host of fields. Closely related 
organisations are the International Transport Forum for coordination 
in the field of transport and the International Energy Agency, to 
support the interests of energy-importing countries – originally 
founded to counter OPEC.  
European Free Trade Association (EFTA).The EFTA was formed as a free 
trade area in response to the formation of a customs union by the 
then six member states of the European Economic Community. The 
scope of EFTA did not go beyond industrial and some processed 
agricultural goods. For some time EFTA’s future has been uncertain 
with Austria, Finland and Sweden having later become EU members. 
The current members of EFTA are Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein. On 16 July 2009 Iceland applied to join the EU, with 
accession negotiations having started on 27 July 2010. 
European Economic Area (EEA). The EEA is composed of the EU, 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Economically, the three EEA 
countries are in fact fully integrated into the EU, as they fall under the 
single market rules and EU laws on competition and free movement. 
(The only exceptions in the economic field are thus the common 
agricultural and fisheries policies of the EU.) In addition, EEA 
members are equal to full EU members in a number of funding 
programmes, such as research funding, and they pay into the EU 
budget. They only have limited means to influence economic 
regulation (e.g. single market legislation), however, as they do not 
have a seat on the Council of Ministers. A Joint Committee consisting 
of the EEA countries and the European Commission has the function 
of extending relevant EU law to the EEA countries. 
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Note: For a more detailed version, see the European Commission’s website, “Codecision”, 
Brussels, 30 July 2010 (http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/stepbystep/text/index_en.htm). 
Source: European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/images/codecision-
flowchart_en.gif). 108 |  
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